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ABSTRACT
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution mentions no citizen right to access 
government information. However, a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions forged an 
implied right to access information through the First Amendment. This approach to 
finding new constitutional rights within the language and spirit of the Constitution shows 
how our fundamental rights are ever-growing and evolving to adapt to modern needs. The 
origins of this movement can be traced back to legal and free speech philosophers who 
insisted that for a democracy to function, its citizenry must be well informed. This thesis 
is an historic and legal analysis of the Supreme Court’s finding of a right of access 
through Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, and the one-year period before the ruling in 
which the Gannett Newspapers v. DePasquale decision caused hundreds of motions for 
court closures.
In 1980, justices established the press and public have a constitutional right to 
attend court hearings. However, courts across the nation continue to resist attempts by the 
public and press to attend hearings, giving little weight to their right of access. Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court has established that an overriding government interest must be 
shown to close a court hearing, many judges fail to take the right of access seriously and 
have chosen to accept flimsy government requests for closure.  Given fractured opinions 
by the justices in Richmond this thesis has identified a need for a clear legal test to judge 
a right of access. This includes making court access an affirmative right, showing 
substantial probability of prejudicial harm for closure, considering alternatives to closure, 
including the right of the public to object and be heard, ensuring the narrow tailoring of
any closure order, and limiting the time span of any closure order so the public can access 
hearing transcripts.
Applying a clear legal test will support the constitutional rights of the public and 
press to access government information and give clear guidance to judges on how to 
handle requests for court closure. Clarifying the confusion created by multiple opinions 
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As a cub reporter first assigned to cover courts in 1998 I knew little about our 
justice system. Like many people, I would expect, I was even surprised that members of 
the public could walk in and observe most court proceedings. Over the years as a 
professional journalist, I had since learned that I could access court hearings, but still had 
no idea what my rights were. I recall the first time a judge dismissed me from attending a
court hearing. It happened so suddenly. I cannot recall if it was the defense or the 
prosecution, but a verbal motion was made for closure to the public, the judge quickly 
ruled from the bench and I was promptly asked to leave the courtroom without a chance 
to object. Frankly, I did not know what I could object to. I felt powerless. I lacked the 
knowledge that could tell me how, as a journalist or a member of the public, I fit into the 
justice system, if at all. It was an intellectual itch that sat in the back of my mind for a 
number of years.
The American courtroom has been the venue for some of the most profound and 
dramatic changes in our society. It is a place where the fates of lives hang in the balance 
or where laws are interpreted and refined. Over the years, I learned the press plays a 
crucial role in relaying news of case outcomes to the general public. Throughout this 
nation’s history members of the press have become an increasingly important vehicle of 
news from the courtroom. Reporters have had a long tradition of observing court 
2proceedings, if not with trepidation by some judges and counsel. Yet, for most of our 
country’s history, tradition has given reporters little legal ground to stand on to challenge 
a judge’s decision to close a hearing to the public. That is, until 1980 in the landmark 
case of  Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, in which the United States Supreme 
Court found a constitutional right of public access to government information under the 
First Amendment for the first time in our nation’s history.1 Before this ruling, the ability 
of the press to cover court hearings was at the whim of the trial judge and supported by 
tradition, not law.2
This thesis is the product of my personal and professional curiosity about the right 
of the public to access justice. What I have discovered is a remarkable story that has 
changed the very nature of the right of citizens to be informed. I have also discovered that 
the press and public do indeed play a crucial role within our system of justice; a role that 
goes beyond simple fancy and curiosity, but is rooted in the core of our concept of justice. 
Knowing the actions of government officials, having access to court proceedings and 
government information, has been well established as crucial for the survival of a 
democracy.3
This thesis takes an historical and legal look at the cases of Gannett Co. v. 
1 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (BURGER, C.J., Opinion of the Court), 448 U.S. 555
(1980).
2 Chief Justice Warren E. Burger gives a detailed description of the English and early American 
traditions of public court hearings in Richmond, which will be discussed in detail. See 
Richmond, 565-571.
3 Influential legal scholars, such as Alexander Meiklejohn and Thomas Emerson, wrote than an 
informed citizenry was essential in ensuring that the public had legitimate participation in a 
democracy. Without being well informed, a true democracy cannot function: Thomas Irwin 
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment (New York: Random House, 
1966), 14. Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (New 
York: Harper Brothers Publishers, 1948),  27.
3DePasquale4
In the years prior to the Richmond decision, constitutional law scholars were 
realizing that a freedom of speech in and of itself was not enough for a functioning 
democracy. Great legal minds the likes of Thomas Emerson and Alexander Meiklejohn 
questioned the value of the freedom of speech and of the press if the public was not 
informed of what the government was doing.
(1979), Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia (1980), and the one-year period
between them. It also explores other cases in the years before and after that dealt with 
court access. Leading up to DePasquale, the Supreme Court was struggling with the role 
of the press and pretrial publicity. The DePasquale decision established that the public 
and press did not have a constitutional right of access to court proceedings, specifically 
pretrial hearings. One year later, the court clarified in Richmond that the public and press 
did indeed have a constitutional right to access some hearings, specifically trials. The 
legal turn was due in part to a rash of court closures by judges across the country. It was 
also driven by a profound shift in legal philosophy.
5
It is clear from the language of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution that 
the government shall not infringe upon the open discussion of government matters by the 
press, or citizens.6
4 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
Over years and generations of precedent, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
refined the First Amendment to mean that open criticism of the government, or 
5 See Note 3.
6 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
4government officials, is protected by the Constitution.7
Nowhere in the First Amendment does it state that citizens have a “right to know,” 
as longtime Associated Press journalist Kent Cooper was fond of calling it.
Yet, establishing a clear right by 
which citizens can educate themselves about government affairs has been much more 
difficult to accomplish.
8
A lack of any explicit language still does not mean that such a right does not, or 
cannot, exist. The Bill of Rights was not written to limit rights. Numerous examples in 
our nation’s history show that the spirit of open government was followed at times, but 
because of a lack of solid legislative and legal support, government was also clamped 
shut from the public.
While the 
logic of informed speech is implied, a freedom of information is not mentioned anywhere 
in the U.S. Constitution.
9
7 First, the U.S. Supreme Court established that state laws are subject to constitutional review 
under Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). It then refined that speech against the 
government is protected up until inciting or producing imminent lawless action in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). It also set the limits in which a public official 
could sue the press for defamation and libel, requiring an official to prove an actual malice 
standard in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Taken together, the High Court 
has set a tough standard by which the government can limit political speech.
This remarkable evolution of constitutional law is a story of 
8 Kent Cooper, The Right to Know: An Exposition of the Evils of News Suppression and 
Propaganda (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Cudahy, 1956), 165.
9 Congress passed the Espionage Act in 1917 amid World War I and amended it a year later. The 
loose wording in this act allowed for the prosecution of people who spoke against the war, 
thereby creating a chilling effect in citizens’ ability to have their say in the direction of the 
war. More than 2,000 prosecutions took place. See: Thomas Tedford and Dale Herbeck, 
Freedom of Speech in the United States (State College: Strata Publishing, 2005), 46.
Secret counterintelligence programs by the FBI, CIA and U.S. Army were found to have 
not only spied on U.S. citizens engaged in political, civil rights, and antiwar work, but acted to 
ruin their lives and have them fired from their jobs from 1960 through 1970. These programs 
did not come to light until years later. One such FBI program attempted to turn organized 
crime against the American Communist Party. It was later revealed in 1975 the CIA had a 20-
year file and had been reading the mail of Congresswoman Bella Abzug. See: Franklyn S. 
Haiman, Freedom of Speech (Skokie, Ill.: National Textbook Company; and New York: 
5struggle by journalists, lawmakers and attorneys to slowly forge a “right to know” that 
keeps government doors open for public scrutiny. Within this 20-year period, from 1960 
to 1980, Congress passed the most comprehensive legislation outlining access to 
government documents in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which for the first 
time in U.S. history presumed that all government documents are public unless stated 
otherwise under a list of exemptions.10 Also during this period the U.S. Supreme Court 
tackled the issue of press access to court hearings in a series of rulings, and ultimately 
found the press has a constitutional right under the First Amendment to attend and report 
on criminal trials in the landmark Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia.11
Richmond was significant in recognizing that press coverage of the judicial 
system is a necessary part of informing the public that justice is served. In turn, an 
informed public maintains confidence in our justice system.
As mentioned, the year in between Richmond and  DePasquale was marked by 
attempted court closures, an embattled press concerned with the future of open 
government, and Supreme Court justices struggling to rein in a carriage that got away 
from its driver.12
American Civil Liberties Union, 1976), 40.
This thesis takes a legal and historical look at these two key opinions 
The publication of the Pentagon Papers by The New York Times in 1971 revealed that 
government officials had been systematically lying to the public about actions in Vietnam and 
the justifications for the war. This lead to the landmark Supreme Court prior restraint case of 
New York Times v. U.S. See: New York Times v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
10 The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552.
11 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
12 Although the justices never directly acknowledged that Richmond was a correction of any 
error on their part, that decision was issued one year to the date (July 2, 1980) that 
DePasquale was issued (July 2, 1979).
6and their impact on the ability of the press to cover the business of courts across the 
nation. It analyzes Supreme Court opinions, along with derivative lower appellate court 
rulings to gain a clear understanding of how justices and judges have interpreted the 
constitution when it comes to access. It analyzes examples of intense press coverage 
leading up to DePasquale, to give a sense of the attitudes and concerns of the courts 
toward press behavior. It also focuses on the one-year period between DePasquale and 
Richmond as a time when the battle over the issue of court access reached critical mass.
This qualitative historical/legal study examines articles compiled using online 
database archives of national and local newspapers before 1979 up to 1980 to better 
understand the reaction of journalists to High Court rulings and their concerns over their 
ability to cover court hearings. The thesis also reviews books written on freedom of 
access around this time and law review articles examining the significance of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions. The texts of the High Court’s rulings are also examined in 
detail to gain a better understanding of the justices’ reasoning and the evolution of their 
thinking.
While several legal and journalism scholars have written pieces about these 
opinions, many have overlooked the one-year period between the two rulings, the 
reaction judges and journalists had to DePasquale before Richmond was issued, and how 
quickly justices of the Supreme Court took action to clarify themselves amid a rash of 
court closures. This almost immediate reaction by judges during this one-year period 
reveals an innate bias within the judiciary culture against press presence, which still 
exists today in some courtrooms.
In looking at the period between DePasquale and Richmond, it is clear that 
7attorneys and judges across the country were quick to take advantage of the High Court’s
ruling and exclude the press from court hearings. Part of this is due to past poor behavior 
on the part of reporters, which soured court attitudes toward the press. While the 
Richmond ruling helped establish the historic and legal role of the press in the justice 
system, this study argues that the lack of a clear legal test in Richmond has allowed 
judges to dismiss the right of press access, even to this day.
The Richmond ruling was far from settled. While the justices reversed their 
attitude regarding constitutional access, there were seven fractured supporting opinions,
five of which supported reversal of DePasquale, but for differing reasons. Subsequent 
Supreme Court rulings since Richmond have worked to solidify the High Court’s position 
on access, but this author argues a clear constitutional test is still needed.
The twenty-year period leading up to DePasquale, and especially the one-year 
period between 1979 and 1980, embody the uncertainty members of the press had over 
the future of covering the courts and of the justices who pondered what place reporters 
should have in the justice system, if any. The words of the justices in both opinions, as 
well as newspaper articles, books and law journals, tell the story of a struggle between 
journalists and judges to find a place for those whom Justice Potter Stewart referred to as 
“strangers” in the courtroom.13
Chapter II explores the legal development of access theory and the methodologies 
applied for this study. Chapter III reviews the literature written on the subject of court 
access and confirms a consensus among scholars that Richmond was a landmark case, but 
shows little has been written regarding the case’s historic and legal context. It also shows 
13 DePasquale, 386.
8that few studies consider the one-year period between DePasquale and Richmond as a 
possible catalyst for Richmond’s creation. Chapter IV reviews the case history of court
access rulings leading up to DePasquale and  Richmond, and the reaction by both 
journalists and judges. Chapter V analyzes how Richmond has shaped subsequent 
Supreme Court access rulings and how the issue of court access appears far from settled, 
with new methods of discouraging press presence being enacted. Chapter VI concludes 
this study by claiming that ensuring the future of a transparent justice system in the 
United States will require a clear legal test and a reaffirmation that members of the public 
and press have never been, nor should be, “strangers” to the court.
CHAPTER II
ORIGIN OF LEGAL ACCESS THEORY - HISTORICAL AND LEGAL
METHODS, AND THEIR APPLICATIONS FOR THIS PROJECT
To better understand the crucial need for a right of access to government 
information within our democracy, we must understand how it was formed and for what 
purpose. Although a right of access cannot be found within the Constitution’s
amendments, its development has mainly been a late twentieth-century phenomenon 
within the field of legal philosophy. While neither the Supreme Court, nor Congress, has 
afforded equal standing of this concept alongside the constitutional right of freedom of 
speech for much of U.S. history, the notion has been around since before the early days of 
this country.
The theory of access to government information stems from the ancient tradition 
of free expression within democracy. John Milton’s Areopagitica in 1644 clarified that 
ancient Greek philosophers espoused the importance of free expression as a way to 
access information and knowledge.14 This importance of a free flow of information was 
further supported by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty in 1869: “There must be discussion, 
to show how experience is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually 
yield to fact and argument.”15
14 John Milton,  Areopagitica (London, 1644), paragraphs 4, 5.
15 John Stuart Mill, Charles W. Elliot, ed., On Liberty, “Of the Liberty of Thought and 
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James Madison, the nation’s fourth president, expressed the basic need for the 
public to have access to information in order for the notion of self-governing to function:
A popular government, without popular information or the means of acquiring it, 
is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever 
govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm 
themselves with the power knowledge gives.16
This theory of a need for an informed public was further explored in the twentieth 
century (1948) by legal philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn: “The principle of the 
freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-government.”17
While Meiklejohn did not specifically claim that the Constitution granted a right of 
access, he did make it clear that access to information was important for citizens to make 
important and relevant decisions.18
Between 1973 and 1977, legal philosopher Thomas Emerson, a major architect in 
modern civil liberty law, was one of the first to articulate the concept of access theory:
The public, as sovereign, must have all information available in order to instruct 
its servants, the government. As a general proposition, there can be no holding 
back of information; otherwise, ultimate decision-making by the people, to whom 
the function is committed, becomes impossible.19
Discussion” (1869; reprint, New York: Barnes & Noble, 2004), 20.
16 James Madison, “Letter to W.T. Barry” (August 4, 1822), in Gaillard P. Hunt, ed., The 
Writings of James Madison (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1910), 103.
17 Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (New York: Harper 
Brothers Publishers, 1948), 26.
18 Ibid., 27.
19 Thomas I. Emerson, “Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment,” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 125, 737 (1977): 755.
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Free speech and a right to know information, Emerson wrote, were two 
complementing sides that were necessary to form a complete system of the freedom of 
expression.20
 It is essential to personal self-fulfillment.
Emerson posited four reasons for a constitutionally-protected right to access 
information under the First Amendment:
 It is necessary for seeking the truth, or at least a better answer.
 It is necessary for collective decision making in a democracy.
 It is vital for effecting social change without resorting to violence or undue 
coercion.21
If, as Meiklejohn and Emerson stated, an informed populace is necessary for the 
public to participate in self-governance, then it is easier to argue that a right of access to 
government information should be constitutionally protected and may be an implied right 
under the First Amendment. As such, public access to the three branches of government, 
including the judicial branch, is a necessary function of a democracy.
Of course, legal access theory remained just that, theory, and would not become a 
right of access to government information until the Supreme Court validated it as a 
constitutional right. This process began judicially in 1978, stumbling through the period 
of DePasquale and emerging as a clear constitutional right in 1980 with Richmond.
It was through the works of Meiklejohn and Emerson that we see the first real 
impact access theory had on the justices of the Supreme Court. In their concurring 
opinion to the majority in Richmond, Justices William J. Brennan and Thurgood Marshall 
20 Emerson, “The First Amendment and the Right to Know – Legal Foundations of the Right to 
Know,” Washington Law Quarterly 1973, no. 1 (1976): 2.
21 Ibid., 2.
12
directly cited both Meiklejohn and Emerson when they supported the notion that the First 
Amendment “has a structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican system 
of self-government,” specifically when it comes to a right of access to government
information.22 Meiklejohn’s notion of an informed populace was again cited by Justice 
John Paul Stevens in his dissent in Houchins v. KQED when he pointed out that, “Our 
system of self-government assumes the existence of an informed citizenry.”23
The theory of access to government information was also moved beyond theory to 
well-established fact in both state and federal governments through the Freedom of 
Information Act24 and a variety of open government, or “sunshine,” laws for state 
records.25
22 Richmond, 588. Justices Brennan and Marshall’s joint decision cites a list of cases and authors 
immediately after this quote. Among them, Emerson and Meiklejohn can clearly be noticed: 
“See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938); Grosjean v. 
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249-250 (1936); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 
369 (1931); Brennan, supra, at 176-177; J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 93-94 (1980); T. 
Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 7 (1970); A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its 
Relation to Self-Government (1948); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 23 (1971).”
More contemporary scholars have further refined access theory. Free-speech 
23 Houchins v. KQED (Stevens, dissenting opinion), 438 U.S. 1 (1978): 31. Stevens’ citation for 
this statement appears as follows: “See A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-
Government, 26 (1948): ‘Just so far as…. the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied 
acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to 
that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning, for the general 
good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the First 
Amendment to the Constitution is directed.’”
24 5 U.S.C. 552.
25 Florida’s Government-in-the-Sunshine Law (Fla. Stat. § 286.011), passed in 1967, is one of 
the most liberal open records and meetings laws in the United States. California has its 
California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.)  and California Open Meeting Act 
(Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq.). Utah has its Government Records Access and Management Act 
(Utah Code § 63G-2-201) , and Utah Open and Public Meetings Act (Utah Code § 52-4-102). 
Pretty much every state now has laws regarding records access and open meetings regulations.
13
scholar Herbert Foerstel posited three levels of access as outlined by Supreme Court 
cases. The first level is the prevention of the government from suppressing views and 
facts about government affairs from citizens. The second level is the government’s
obligation to comply with demands by its citizens for information. The third, which 
Foerstel said has yet to be upheld by the courts, is an affirmative obligation to inform the
public by making information publicly available before a request is made.26
Free speech philosopher Franklyn Haiman posited that, to make free speech 
“more than empty words,” access to information by citizens is required.27
If the citizens of a democracy are the rulers, and the government their servant, 
then it follows that those citizens must not be prevented by their government from 




Law professor Lillian R. BeVier noted that through the course of several key 
rulings, which will be discussed in this thesis, the U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed the 
premise “that the Constitution assigns affirmative value to an informed public.”29
However, BeVier remained skeptical that the rulings have imposed a constitutional duty 
upon the government to grant access, such as court hearings, or disclose information.30
Law professor C. Edwin Baker remained concerned over press organizations and 
26 Herbert N. Foerstel, Freedom of Information and the Right to Know (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1999), 14.
27 Haiman, Freedom of Speech, 42.
28 Ibid.
29 Lillian R. BeVier, “An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional 
Principle,” California Law Review 68, no. 3 (May, 1980): 483.
30 Ibid. 484.
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attorneys seeking a constitutionally-mandated access right.31 Baker argued that having 
such a right would not protect the “integrity” of the press and worried that, if there was to 
be a constitutional right of access to government information, government officials would 
turn to destroying documents to cover up abuse.32 Baker called for more work by the 
press in finessing information from government officials through unofficial channels, 
using political tools and the threat of public shaming.33
To understand the evolution of this theory, from budding notion to full-fledged 
law of the land under Richmond’s constitutional finding of a right of access, this thesis 
engages historical and legal methods. Historians often see their research as the pulling 
together of empirical evidence to form a better understanding of past events, but that is 
This author finds Baker’s position 
short-sighted. To assume that seeking a constitutional right of access in pursuit of an 
informed public is not something worth establishing is selling citizens short of their 
inherent right to participate in government. By bartering in the shadows, the press 
becomes little more than beggars for information and beholden to government officials as 
masters and gatekeepers. From Watergate to the Pentagon Papers, even to the 2010 
WikiLeaks release of U.S. military and diplomatic documents, Baker’s fear of destroying 
the evidence of wrongdoing appears to be unfounded, though some people do try. The 
public and press need a constitutional finding of access in order to participate in 
government and to also ensure that government officials are doing the will of the people.





just the first step. The historian then asks what consequences past events have had on the 
present. The structure of the past is often seen as a model for the present and helps to 
serve as a “social memory” with which we can compare the present.34
To answer these questions, the evidence gathered must be verifiable primary-
source accounts of what took place. In this thesis primary-source accounts are comprised 
of Supreme Court rulings written by the justices and published in order to explain their
legal and philosophical reasoning. They also include articles and editorials written by 
journalists, who offered accounts of their concern for the future of transparent 
government and their ability to relay to the public the actions of the government. Primary
sources are then supplemented with secondary-source analysis of works written by both 
legal and communication scholars to better inform the discussion of these questions. 
Great effort and care was made to ensure that key rulings and news articles on court 
access were identified and thoroughly reviewed. Significant effort was also taken to 
search through multiple publication databases to locate relevant works regarding court 
access in order to give a clear sense of the state of research in this field among scholars. 
Connections among this evidence are then made and should be apparent to readers.
In this study I ask: 
Why in a one-year period did the U.S. Supreme Court do an apparent turn-around on its 
position of press access to court hearings? Why were the positions of the justices in 
Richmond so splintered, and what effect did it have on the lower courts?
35
34 David Paul Nord and Harold L. Nelson, “The Logic of Historical Research,” Research 
Methods in Mass Communication (New York: Prentice Hall, 1981), 283-285.
This 
35 Mary Ann Yodelis Smith, “The Method of History,” Research Methods in Mass 
Communication, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1989), 311-317.
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work’s method, reasoning, and path to conclusions should not only be clear to readers, 
but the paths through the cited evidence leading to those conclusions should be easily 
followed and replicated by other scholars.
My goal is to review the historical evidence, discuss the scholarly field, and then 
build on past research by addressing unanswered questions that are important to 
understanding the value of the right of access. Historians do not claim that study of the 
past allows the prediction of the future, but a study of what people have done in the past 
can lead to insight into the possibilities to make improvements.36
Because this thesis involves an inspection of the formation of the law, a legal 
analysis of court decisions is also helpful. In looking at the “web of relationships” among 
associated court cases, broader themes emerge that impact current jurisprudence and 
society in general.
In this case, the actions 
of judges across the nation after DePasquale can clarify the need for protection of a 
citizen’s right to court access under the law.
37 By analyzing the language of legal reasoning, and dicta38
36 James D. Startt and Wm. David Sloan, Historical Methods in Mass Communication (Newport, 
Ala.: Vision Press, 2003), 10.
we can 
reach a better understanding of what the High Court’s justices found compelling and 
important in reaching their decisions. Analysis of the law is often referred to as legal 
argument. The law speaks through a multitude of voices, like a choir singing the same 
37 Donald M. Gillmore and Everette E. Dennis, “Legal Research in Mass Communication,” 
Research Methods in Mass Communication, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
1989), 343.
38 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, dicta (plural for dictum), is a comment by a judge in a 
decision or ruling which is not required, but may state a legal principle as a judge understands 
it.
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song but not all in harmony.39 The foundation of law is based on the innate understanding 
of right and wrong. While the more classic form of Western law was based on certain 
“laws of nature,” today’s contemporary law rejects the notion of natural truth, but rather 
draws upon five sources for the formation of law and argument: texts, author intent, 
precedent, tradition and policy.40 These five types of legal argument, or combination 
thereof, are what attorneys and judges often recognize as legitimate legal argumentation. 
The list of five are a progression in scope, with text being the most narrow and policy 
being the most broad in scope of interpretation. Text is seen as the literal reading of the 
word. Intent supplements text with an understanding of author’s purpose. Precedent takes 
text and intent into the holdings and opinions of multiple courts. Tradition is the context 
of court opinions in how a community conducts itself. Finally, policy is the expression of 
the values and interest in which the law is meant to serve. In this thesis, I consider the 
text of legal philosophers and Supreme Court opinions. By comparing majority, 
concurring and dissenting opinions in a given case, the intent of the justices emerges. 
Comparing related cases on court access, precedent then emerges, in which the evolution 
in legal thought can be traced. Evidence of tradition and applied court policies, identified
through court case histories and news accounts, can then reveal possible disconnects in 
the law between Supreme Court precedent and how lower courts have applied the law.41
Historical research is often linked to legal research. Understanding the evolution 





of law requires historical context.42
It is also not unusual for a communication scholar to delve into legal analysis. 
Issues of free speech and the free flow of information are often central to the study of 
communication. Communication scholars have published their legal research in 
communication journals, and in law review journals.
Such a combination of historical and legal 
methodology provides this thesis the analytical tools to answer its research questions.
43 One may argue that legal research 
outside the realm of dedicated legal study is less beholden to the judiciary and that the 
communication scholar can take a look at legal precedent with a more legally-
disinterested eye, meaning the scholar is less concerned with using case law to bend an 
argument.44
The legal researcher sets down a provocative proposition and marshals evidence 
to support its plausibility, and that evidence may come from opinions for the 
court, dissenting opinions, legislative histories, constitutional interpretation, and 
legal commentaries.
Finally, traditional legal research provides the communication scholar with a 
method for argument:
45
The primary focus of this thesis is to examine the U.S. Supreme Court’s role in 
establishing a constitutional right of access under the First Amendment. Thus, I explore 
two key rulings that came down a year apart: In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale the High 






evidentiary and suppression hearings.46 In the second, Richmond, the court held the press 
had a constitutional right of access to cover trial proceedings.47 I begin by examining the 
perceived problem judges had with press coverage of criminal trials. Several early 
Supreme Court rulings did not bode well for the press. One case involving a high-profile 
murder trial was so extreme, justices cautioned reporters for restraint and civility.48 Soon 
the issue of pretrial publicity and the press’s right to cover court hearings was addressed 
head on, a year before Richmond the Supreme Court found no constitutional right of 
access in covering pretrial hearings by the press.49 After the ruling, however, some 
justices seemed to have regretted their decision. This is supported by public statements 
made by five justices, who emphasized the importance of the press’s role in the justice 
system.50 I argue these statements were made after a rash of court closures hit the 
country. A study conducted by the American Society of Newspaper Editors showed there 
had been several hundred motions to close court hearings by judges before Richmond.51
46 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
47 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
48 Sheppard v. Maxwell, Warden, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
49 DePasquale.
50 See: Ed Cony, “The Growth of Secret Trials,” Wall Street Journal, December 17, 1979, 24. 
Linda Greenhouse, “Stevens Says Closed Trials May Justify New Laws,” The New York 
Times, September 9, 1979, 41. Editorial, “The Open Disarray of Closed Justice,” The New 
York Times, August 18, 1979, 18. Linda Greenhouse, “Powell Says Court Has No Hostility 
Toward Press,” The New York Times, August 14, 1979, A, 13. Linda Greenhouse, “Stevens 
Says Closed Trials May Justify New Laws,” The New York Times, September 9, 1979, 41.
51 Deirdre Carmody, “Newspapers Debating Effect of Court Rulings On Their Operations: 
Newspapers Debate Rulings’ Effect Upon Operations ‘A Dampening Effect’ A Never-Ending 
Battle Ordered Not to Write Nuisance Lawsuits,” The New York Times, April 7, 1980, A, 1. 
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Judges had taken the court’s opinion as carte blanche to exclude the press.
A review of 17 U.S. Supreme Court decisions from 1936 through 1984 shows the 
legal evolution of the court regarding press access.52 In addition, news articles not only 
show the press’s reaction to these rulings, but also show evidence of court closures by 
judges across the country and their lax reasoning.53 Law review articles regarding 
Richmond support the notion that from both an historical and legal perspective, this was a 
landmark case for journalists, attorneys and citizen groups concerned over access 
rights.54
Taken together, these data indicate that even today some judges and bureaucrats 
resist the notion that the public’s business should be conducted in public. A brief review 
of news articles since Richmond shows judges continuing to disregard this right by giving 
According to the study done by the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 239 motions for 
closure were known, of those 185 were examined. Of the 185 attempts, 121 involved pretrial 
proceedings, 37 involved trials or convictions, 19 involved pre-indictment proceedings and 
eight involved sentencings.
52 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). Irvin v. Dowd, 381 U.S. 532 (1961). 
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). New York 
Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971). Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974). Murphy 
v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975). Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978). Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 
(1981). Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984). Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
53 See, e.g., Charlotte Evans, “Rising Number of Court Cases Closed to Press,” The New York 
Times, October 13, 1979, 21.
54 See, e.g., Michael J. Hayes, “What Ever Happened to ‘The Right to Know’?: Access to 
Government-Controlled Information since Richmond Newspapers,” Virginia Law Review 73,
no. 6 (September 1987): 1111-1143. The author notes that the Supreme Court took the first 
step in ensuring democracy by supporting citizens’ access to government information.
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little or no weight to it against government interest.55
55 See, e.g., “Judge: Jury Selection in Western Ky. Murder Case to be Closed,” The Associated 
Press, February 16, 2008. “Judges Increasingly Closing Public Access to Courts,” The 
Associated Press, September 3, 2007. Dale Wetzel, “Judge Closes Hearing in Gibbs Case, 
Wonders if Jury Deadlocked,” The Associated Press, July 12, 2007.
The spirit of opening government to 
the scrutiny of the press, and thereby the public, seems to have been exchanged for an 
entitlement to conducting business behind closed doors for the sake of expediency. Sadly, 
those same individuals fail to realize the broader implication of their actions and the 
damage they do to our democracy and the public’s confidence in its government. This 
thesis seeks to ascertain the legitimacy of this claim through the cited data.
CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW - RICHMOND AS A LANDMARK CASE
One of the few academic articles published in the period between DePasquale and 
Richmond regarding court access was written by Ninth Circuit Judge, and former 
journalist, Hon. Alfred T. Goodwin. In his pre-Richmond article, Goodwin claimed that 
both judges and journalists had overreacted to the Supreme Court’s DePasquale finding 
that the press had no constitutional right to attend criminal trials under the Sixth 
Amendment. He blamed both judges and journalists for failing to recognize certain 
necessary roles each group plays in the justice system, calling their contentious 
relationship a “shotgun wedding.”56 Still, Goodwin noted the rash of court closures 
across the nation after the ruling was “unprecedented.”57 He said judges tend to be leery 
of the press because, as attorneys, they are accustomed to conducting their business 
behind the veil of attorney-client privilege.58 However, he also criticized the press for 
taking an absolutist view of the First Amendment, in which no other constitutional 
interest can override it, including a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.59
56 Alfred T. Goodwin, “Press-Court Relations: Can They Be Improved?” Hastings Constitutional 





Goodwin’s article is a rare glimpse into the sometimes divisive relationship judges 
have with the press, even today.60
The ultimate test of a court’s persuasiveness is the degree to which the public 
accepts and follows its decisions. And the press is the instrument through which 
the courts communicate their reasoning to the public. Our authority, our 
persuasiveness, is linked to the vitality of the press.
In his conclusion, he makes a bold statement regarding 
what he sees as an integral relationship:
61
In a statement that would prove prophetic, Goodwin did note that the Supreme 
Court found no constitutional right of access under the Sixth Amendment, but had yet to 
address such a right under the First Amendment.62
Since the Richmond ruling a handful of legal and journalism scholars have written 
about the case. On the whole, these scholars tend to fall into three distinct camps: those
who support the view that the case created a constitutional right; those who were 
skeptical about the ruling establishing a right of access; and scholars who took a 
derivative look at the case and wanted the right expanded to apply to other types of 
hearings and information. Still, it is clear that Richmond is seen by these scholars as a 
seminal case in the movement toward government access. A key citation search on legal 
databases63
60 See note 48.
showed that Richmond has been cited in more than 2,877 state and federal 
cases. This includes 1,169 U.S. Supreme Court opinions, of which the most recent was in
61 Goodwin, 642.
62 Ibid., 638.
63 See, e.g., Westlaw, HeinOnline, Lexis Academic Universe.
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1999.64
A search of U.S. law review journals shows eleven foundational articles about 
Richmond, most of them published within the first four years following the release of the 
ruling. Most scholars cited Richmond as a key case in arguing for a constitutional right of 
access to government information beyond criminal trials. Some argue the case supports a 
constitutional right to access pretrial court documents, while others argue that 
Richmond’s language is broad enough to be applied toward access to all branches of 
government.
This indicates that Richmond is still considered good law. In addition, about 
1,400 law review articles cite the case. However, a more in-depth search of those articles 
revealed that, while Richmond is cited often, only a handful of law articles are actually 
dedicated to the case, or the subject of court access.
One of the first law journal analyses of Richmond focused on the ruling as a 
vindication of the First Amendment after DePasquale.65 Though Anthony Lewis called 
the handling of  DePasquale and the fractured decisions of Richmond a “disaster,” he 
concluded there would not have been a constitutional finding of access without them.66
Lewis implied that Richmond would have far-reaching implications outside of court that 
could lead to greater access to government.67
64 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
So far, that has not appeared to have 
happened.
65 Anthony Lewis, “A Public Right to Know About Public Institutions: The First Amendment as 




In contrast, two months before the Richmond decision in 1980, legal scholar 
Lillian BeVier argued no First Amendment right to know existed and was skeptical that 
the Supreme Court would “transform” the First Amendment into a “vehicle” to impose a 
duty of disclosure upon the government.68
These first articles show how divided legal scholars were over the right of access 
and how best to handle involvement by the public and press within government.
Legal scholar Karen Burrows, in 1983, saw Richmond as an evolution of the First 
Amendment to better fit modern times, in which people rely more upon the press to 
inform them of government business given hectic modern schedules, something 
mentioned by Justices Burger and Brennan in their opinions in Richmond:
It is not clear whether the Framers intended a specific or general interpretation of 
the first amendment, but if one believes in the need for the first amendment to 
promote free and open expression, the first amendment must go beyond what the 
Framers specifically intended.69
In 1984, journalism scholar Deckel McLean argued for an access right and called 
for a clear legal balancing test in which the public’s right to know is assumed unless there 
is an overriding government interest.70 Legal scholar Anne Cohen claimed the opinions 
could be extended to include court documents, both civil and criminal,71
68 Lillian R. BeVier, “An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional 
Principle,” California Law Review 68, no. 3 (May, 1980): 484.
while fellow 
69 Karen B. Burrows, “First Amendment – The Right of Access to Criminal Trials Extended,” 
The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 73, no. 4 (1983): 1388.
70 Deckel McLean, “The Impact of Richmond Newspapers,” Journalism Quarterly (1984): 786.
71 Anne Elizabeth Cohen, “Access to Pretrial Documents under the First Amendment,” Columbia 
Law Review 84, no. 7 (November 1984): 1813.
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legal scholar Michael Hayes claimed in 1987 the broad language used by the justices 
could extend the right to other branches of the government outside of the judicial branch, 
citing the political speech right of a citizen to be able to participate in governance.72
Later, legal scholar Timothy Dyk cited the case as a call for a special press access right 
above that of the general public, claiming the importance of the press as a proxy for 
public participation. In finding that Richmond lacked unity and clarity, Dyk also called 
for a clear balancing test that would eliminate arbitrary decisions by judges.73
A few legal scholars appeared to be more pessimistic about the ruling’s
significance. Lyle Denniston wrote that the ruling would do little to stop judges from 
kicking out journalists, citing language in Justice Brennan’s Richmond opinion that 
appeared to give leeway to judges to set aside the right of access under “appropriate 
circumstances.”74 Others argued against Richmond, saying judges should have a right to 
deny access to hearings and trials,75 as well as pretrial documents,76
72 Michael Hayes, “What Ever Happened to ‘The Right to Know?’: Access to Government-
Controlled Information since Richmond Newspapers,” Virginia Law Review 73, no. 6 
(September 1987): 1111.
both as a way to 
maintain order and control over the judicial process.
73 Timothy B. Dyk, “Newsgathering, Press Access and the First Amendment,” Stanford Law 
Review 44, no. 5 (May 1992): 927.
74 Lyle Denniston, “Right of Access: the Birth of a Concept,” California Law Review (November 
1982): 47.
75 Burton B. Roberts, ed. George R. Rodman, “A Judge’s View,” Mass Media Issues: Analysis 
and Debate (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1984), 283.
76 Arthur R. Miller, “Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts,” 
Harvard Law Review 105, no. 2 (December 1991): 427.
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Richmond continues to be cited in more recent events. After the attack on the 
World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001, the government took steps 
to restrict access to court hearings and certain kinds of information. Howard Chu cited 
Richmond in his argument against closing federal immigration hearings to the public after 
the Bush Administration closed deportation hearings,77
Some communication scholars have also analyzed the subject of courtroom 
access. In 1984, Roy Leeper conducted an analysis of Richmond, breaking down each of 
the seven concurring opinions and then exploring the objections by legal scholars over 
the fractured nature of the ruling. Leeper explored the possibility of using the open 
language of the justices to expand a right of access to other types of government hearings 
and information.
particularly for people of Middle-
Eastern descent.
78 In 1986, Ann Plamondon conducted an analysis of Richmond, and the 
Supreme Court cases which sprang from it, to argue that the right of access has continued 
to evolve to include more types of court hearings, outside of criminal trials (this will be 
further discussed later in this thesis). She also argued that it appeared the Supreme Court 
indicated a right of access should be limited and certain information or testimony may be 
sealed from public view for a variety of reasons expressed by judges, including private 
information, security concerns, or trade secrets in civil litigation.79
77 Howard W. Chu, “Is Richmond Newspapers in Peril after 9/11?” Ohio State Law Journal 64
(2003): 1655.
78 Roy V. Leeper, “Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia and the Emerging Right of Access,” 
Journalism Quarterly 6, no. 3 (1984): 615.
79 Ann L. Plamondon, “Recent Developments in Law of Access,” Journalism Quarterly 63, no. 1 
(1986): 61.
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Over the years, other communication scholars have taken a more derivative look 
at courtroom access, choosing to focus on specific issues, such as an access right to civil 
discovery materials, federal immigration deportation hearings, and juvenile courts.80
Kathleen Olson conducted an interesting analysis of the Supreme Court’s attitude toward 
courtroom access corresponding to times of crisis, such as the attacks on 9/11.81
Among the works of legal and communication scholars, none focus on the one-
year period between DePasquale and Richmond, look at the underlying historic and legal 
situation that gave rise to both cases, or the reaction by the press, judges and justices in 
that one-year period.
Fewer books address the issue of Richmond or court access. A database search for 
books82 revealed literally thousands of books that cite “court access” and/or “Richmond 
Newspapers.” Unfortunately, the majority of published books in this list are college-level 
textbooks related to law or journalism.83
80 See Hosoon Chang, “The News Media’s Right of Access to Pretrial Discovery Materials in 
Civil Lawsuits,” Journalism Quarterly 71, no. 1 (1994): 145. Dale L. Edwards, “If It Walks, 
Talks and Squawks Like a Trial, Should It Be Covered Like One? The Right of the Press to 
Cover INS Deportation Hearings,” Communication Law & Policy 10 (2005): 217. Emily 
Metzgar, “Neither Seen Nor Heard: Media in America’s Juvenile Courts,” Communication 
Law & Policy 12 (2007): 177.
The case is usually cited as an important historic 
81 Kathleen Olson, “Courtroom Access after 9/11: A Pathological Perspective,” Communication 
Law & Policy 7 (2002): 461.
82 Typically WorldCat is the most comprehensive book database, but this author also searched 
for books related to Richmond and court access in Lexis Academic Universe, Jstore and 
Google Books as well.
83 See, e.g., Thomas L. Tedford and Dale A. Herbeck, Feedom of Speech in the United States
(State College, Penn.: Strata Publishing, 2005). Don R. Pember and Clay Calvert, Mass Media 
Law (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010).
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moment in legal and journalism history.
Still, a few books dedicate a chapter to the subject of court access, and one author 
was found to have dedicated an entire book to the issue. Warren Freedman’s book, Press 
and Media Access to the Criminal Courtroom, appears to be a rare work on the subject.84
The book Covering the Courts compiles works from various authors, and 
dedicates most of its space to how courts apply access to high-profile trials, such as the
trials of Timothy McVeigh and O.J. Simpson. It also addresses the issue of cameras in the 
courtroom.
Though short, 126 pages, Freedman’s study looks at the Supreme Court’s evolution of 
access to court hearings, as well as the issue of access to court documents. He also tackles
issues of prior restraint of the press by judges, tort liability, treatment of juveniles in 
court, pretrial publicity, and the presence of electronic recording devices in courtrooms. 
Freedman’s work is broader in scope than this thesis but lacks some of the detail this 
thesis explores, such as events surrounding DePasquale and Richmond. However, his 
book covers many more topics that greatly contribute to the understanding of the 
importance of court access.
85 Author Bruce Sanford focused his conference paper on the importance of 
court access and called for the Supreme Court to speak once again on the subject to create 
a definitive legal test.86
84 Warren Freedman, Press and Media Access to the Criminal Courtroom (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1988).
Writing on Richmond, Sanford noted, “Not since New York Times 
85 Robert Giles and Robert W. Snyder, eds., Covering the Courts: Free Press, Fair Trials & 
Journalistic Performance (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1999).
86 Ibid., “No Contest,” 3.
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v. Sullivan had the Court taken such a breathtaking constitutional step in the free speech 
area.”87 David O’Brien took a more critical look at court access, and wrote that the 
DePasquale and Richmond decisions actually did more harm to the right of access than 
good because of their ambiguity and clear lack of guidance to the courts as to when 
closure is justified.88
Whether speculating on future potential or arguing for a constitutional right of 
access, the common thread among these scholars is that they focused on how Richmond
should be applied, but spent little, if any, space exploring the legal and historic context 
that gave rise to the ruling. It is helpful in understanding the purpose of Richmond and its 
role in creating an access right to look at the situation created by DePasquale a year prior, 
reaction by press, scholars and even the justices themselves, leading up to its creation. It 
is also helpful to visit key cases that lead to the DePasquale decision in order to gain 
insight into the building frustration of judges regarding press behavior during criminal 
trials. This thesis seeks to fill in this knowledge gap by offering a study of the context in 
which Richmond came about and emphasize its importance in protecting the rights of the 
public and press to access court hearings - a need that remains important to this day as 
judges and journalists continue to struggle with finding ways to coexist.
87 Ibid., 7.
88 David M. O’Brien, “The Trials and Tribulations of Courtroom Secrecy and Judicial 
Craftsmanship: Reflections on Gannett and Richmond Newspapers,” in Censorship, Secrecy, 
Access, and Obscenity, Theodore R. Kupferman, ed. (Westport, Conn.: Meckler Corp., 1990), 
177.
CHAPTER IV
THE BUMPY ROAD TO RICHMOND - A LEGAL AND
HISTORIC EVOLUTION
The main motive for judges seeking to close pretrial hearings and trials to the 
press and public stems from the constitutional right of a defendant to have a “speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury.”89 Judges fear that pretrial publicity in a criminal case 
will taint prospective jurors and ruin a defendant’s chances of being judged by a jury that 
is impartial to the facts in the case. One particular murder trial came to embody press 
behavior at its worst: Sheppard v. Maxwell.90
Caught up in a wave of publicity, reporters descended upon Cleveland, Ohio, in 
1954 to cover the murder of Marilyn Sheppard, the pregnant wife of Dr. Sam Sheppard. 
Mrs. Sheppard was found bludgeoned to death on July 4, 1954, in the upstairs bedroom 
of the couple’s Cleveland-suburb home. Sheppard recounted struggling with a “shadowy 
figure” in the bedroom before he was knocked unconscious.91
Sheppard was arrested and charged in his wife’s murder, actions demanded by 
89 United States Constitution, Bill of Rights, Sixth Amendment.
90 Sheppard v. Maxwell, Warden, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). See, e.g., Freedman, 87. Freedman writes 
that Sheppard was the first time the Supreme Court took concern over pretrial publicity and its 
possible threat to a criminal defendant’s fair-trial right.
91 Sheppard, 336.
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local newspapers.92 During the investigation, police allowed reporters into Sheppard’s
home to pick through the crime scene and take photos. This was ironic since police had 
said they had taken the home into “protective custody” and it would remain so until after 
the trial.93 The local coroner, Dr. Sam Gerber, held an inquest in a high school
gymnasium with the press and public present. In a live broadcast, before an audience of 
hundreds, Sheppard was questioned for five and one-half hours about the circumstances 
surrounding his wife’s murder, as well as an affair he had with another woman.94
By the time the case went to trial, press coverage saturated almost every aspect of 
the court proceedings. The names and addresses of jurors were published in newspapers. 
Jurors reported receiving phone calls from people pressuring them to convict Sheppard.
Members of the press were seated so close to the defense table in the trial courtroom that 
Sheppard’s attorney could not have a private conversation with his client without 
reporters being able to listen in.95 On Dec. 21, 1954, the jury found Sheppard guilty of his 
wife’s murder, but the conviction was later appealed.96
92 Ibid., 339.
Although upholding his 




96 Sheppard was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Ohio. His 
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 100 Ohio App. 345, 
128 N.E. 2d 471 (1955); and the Ohio Supreme Court, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E. 2d (1956).
33
“Roman Holiday.”97
Sheppard’s case later inspired several television shows and the motion picture, 
The Fugitive. Twelve years later the U.S. Supreme Court determined Sheppard did not 
receive a fair trial, due in part to the excessive press coverage. “The fact is that bedlam 
reigned at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen took over practically the entire 
courtroom, hounding most of the participants in the trial, especially Sheppard,” wrote 
Justice Tom C. Clark in the majority opinion.98
A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective 
judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. Its function in this regard 
is documented by an impressive record of service over several centuries. The 
press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the 
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes 
to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. This Court has, therefore, been 
unwilling to place any direct limitations on the freedom traditionally exercised by 
the news media for [w]hat transpires in the court room is public property.
In an 8-1 decision, the majority held that 
Sheppard was denied his Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury by the 
pervasive publicity surrounding the case. The First Amendment was never a factor in the 
case. In fact, Justice Clark made clear that the function of the press was acknowledged:
99
One could argue that Sheppard was more of an indictment of the judge, 
prosecution and public officials than anyone else. Clark lambasted the trial judge for 
failing to control the officers of the court and for allowing extrajudicial information to 
97 Ohio Supreme Court, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E. 2d (1956), 342.
98 Sheppard v. Maxwell, Warden, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), 355.
99 Ibid., 384.
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reach the eyes and ears of jurors.100 Clark specifically pointed out that Sheppard’s Sixth 
Amendment rights would have been preserved had the trial judge taken certain “remedial 
measures” to control the flow of information during trial. These included issuing a gag 
order to prevent attorneys from making prejudicial statements to the press, warning the 
press of publishing information not presented as evidence to the jury, changing the venue 
or delaying the trial to avoid publicity affecting jurors, and sequestering the jury from 
outside publicity.101 Already we can see the Supreme Court beginning to form ways in 
which the courts can protect the rights of a criminal defendant without barring the press 
from attending. Clark’s list of suggestions would begin to permeate future rulings, 
although we will soon see that his suggestion of controlling what the press writes about a 
case will run into a First-Amendment problem. Despite the seemingly outrageous 
behavior by reporters, Clark and seven other concurring justices exhibited uncanny 
restraint in not holding outright blame on the press. “In this manner,” Clark wrote, 
“Sheppard’s right to a trial free from outside interference would have been given added 
protection without corresponding curtailment of the news media.”102
The ruling also served as a reminder to the press that its presence in the courtroom 
was based on tradition and was subject to restriction by the trial judge. Clark wrote, “We 
have consistently required that the press have a free hand, even though we sometimes 
100 Ibid., 363.




Such outrageous behavior by the press sparked debate and concern by judges, 
which is reflected in a series of Supreme Court rulings regarding pretrial publicity. In 
Irvin v. Dowd (1961), the Supreme Court ruled a criminal conviction can be overturned if 
publicity results in an identifiable bias of the jury. Justice Clark noted in the majority 
opinion that the presence of a “pattern of deep and bitter prejudice” could result in a 
“wave of public passion,” which could harm a defendant’s chance to a fair trial.104 In 
Estes v. Texas (1965), justices found in a 5-4 decision that television cameras in the 
courtroom could be inherently prejudicial to a defendant,105 calling photography and 
cameras an “indulgence” and stating that the preservation of a publicity-free atmosphere 
“must be maintained at all costs.”106 Justice Clark’s legal reasoning was that the presence 
of cameras would have a psychological effect on witnesses giving testimony and jurors, 
who may watch television trial coverage, influencing their decision. Both groups, Clark 
argued, would be tempted to conform to community opinion and therefore deny the 
defendant his right to trial by an impartial jury, and to confront his accusers and know 
what evidence is against him under the Sixth Amendment.107
But does pretrial publicity always poison the jury pool? That issue was studied in 
103 Ibid., 350.
104 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), 729.




1954 by First Amendment legal scholar, and well-known litigation expert, Harry Kalven, 
who concluded that jurors were not likely swayed by media remarks. Jurors in the study 
recalled reading about the criminal case prior to the trial, but many indicated it did not 
prevent them from changing their minds.108 However, further social scientific studies of 
jurors and their susceptibility to press publicity has been very limited.109
In 1967, after two years of study, the American Newspaper Publishers Association 
published a report regarding the state of press access to court proceedings.110 Having 
examined Colonial history, constitutional origins of the First and Sixth amendments, 
Supreme Court precedent and lower-court rulings, the report found there was no real 
conflict between the First Amendment guarantee of free press and the Sixth Amendment 
rights to a fair and speedy trial, even though there appeared to be a presumption made by 
members of the Bar that the right to a fair trial is not compatible with a free press in 
courts. In fact, the report found the press had a positive influence in assuring a fair trial 
by providing an oversight function that prevents attorney and judicial misconduct.111
The case of jewel thief “Murph the Surf” contributed to the discussion of pretrial 
publicity. In 1975, the Supreme Court ruled 8-1 in Murphy v. Florida that a juror’s prior 
knowledge of a case alone does not prove bias.112
108 Harry Kalven and Hans Ziesel, The American Jury (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).
Murphy was on trial for the armed 
109 Donald M. Gillmor, Free Press and Fair Trial (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1966), 
168.
110 American Newspaper Publishers Association, Free Press and Fair Trial (New York, 1967).
111 Ibid., 1.
112 Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975), 794.
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robbery of a Miami Beach home, but he was already notorious for his part in the 1964 
theft of the Star of India sapphire from a museum in New York. This historic theft and his 
“flamboyant lifestyle” made Murphy a popular media figure.113 Murphy argued that 
media reports of his previous crimes had tainted the jury in his armed robbery trial. 
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote in the court’s opinion that a juror need not be totally 
ignorant of the facts in a case.114 The difference between Murphy and Sheppard was that 
there was no evidence the press interfered directly in the trial process in Murphy. The 
issue was one of pure pretrial publicity and its possible effect on jurors. Marshall’s use of 
the term “utterly corrupted”115 and dissenting Justice William J. Brennan’s use of the 
term “infected with taint”116 indicate that the Supreme Court at times viewed the 
presence of the press in courtrooms as a lingering infection that could flare up and cause 
problems for the courts. Still, Marshall wrote that the burden is on the defendant to 
demonstrate that a juror has an opinion other than a willingness to be impartial, and that 
the defense in Murphy’s case had shown no such “hostility” or unwillingness by jurors to 
lay aside partiality during voir dire.117
In 1976, 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge William J. Bauer, speaking on a 







fourteen years as a prosecutor and ten years as a judge he had never experienced 
pervasive jury bias due to press coverage.118 In his account, which at times included salty 
language, Bauer estimated that even in trials that had press coverage months prior, most 
jurors could not clearly recall what the coverage was about exactly. “Incidentally, in those 
areas where the community is so small that everybody in the community knows what the 
hell happened anyway, I don’t think the media has any impact either,” Bauer said; the 
reason being that prospective jurors cannot be kept completely in the dark and his 
experience showed most jurors are willing to set aside what they have heard about a 
case.119
Yet by 1976, justices were still struggling with press coverage in the courtroom. In 
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled a Nebraska 
judge’s order preventing the press from publishing information about a criminal 
defendant’s alleged confession constituted prior restraint and violated the First 
Amendment.120 In writing the majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger said such 
an order bore a heavy burden by a judge to prove that a fair trial was not possible without 
prior restraint.121
118 American Society of Newspaper Editors, Problems of Journalism: Proceedings of the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors, 1976 (Washington, D.C.: Newspapers Under Fire, 
1976), 226.
Burger called prior restraint “one of the most extraordinary remedies 
known to our jurisprudence,” and should only be considered as a last resort after other 
119 Ibid., 227.
120 Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
121 Ibid., 559.
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alternatives, as cited in Sheppard, have been considered.122
We affirm that the guarantees of freedom of expression are not an absolute 
prohibition under all circumstances, but the barriers to prior restraint remain high 
and the presumption against its use continues intact.123
However, Burger noted that under Nebraska law, one alternative was for the judge 
to simply close the preliminary hearing to the press and thus eliminate the need for prior 
restraint.124 A journalist might have seen this as a sledgehammer solution to a thumbtack. 
Giving judges a procedural out in suggesting to close pretrial hearings before reporters 
can write about them diminished the ruling’s language about defending freedom of press 
and diminished the role of the press as “handmaiden of effective judicial 
administration.”125
In three other rulings that took a broader look at press access to government, the 
justices ruled that the press had no constitutional right to enter prisons to interview 
specific inmates or inspect and report on prison conditions.126
122 Ibid., 562-563.
These rulings also helped 
to solidify the High Court’s view that the press and public had little, if any, entitlement to 
access government facilities by finding there was no right of access under the First 
Amendment. Without a constitutionally backed right of access to government, the public 
and press were mere guests at the humor of government officials.
123 Ibid., 570.
124 Ibid., 569.
125 Sheppard v. Maxwell, Warden, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), 350.
126 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1977).
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These prison access cases, taken along with the legal reasoning in Sheppard,
Murphy, Estes, and Nebraska Press, would stack the deck against any finding of a 
constitutional right of access to courts. Sheppard and Murphy, although they had different 
outcomes, established in the minds of the justices that the press specifically could be 
problematic in its behavior. Estes helped to solidify this sentiment with the introduction 
of electronic mass media technology, which threatened to further taint the pool of 
prospective jurors, and caused the High Court to conclude that the integrity of justice 
must be maintained at all cost. This sentiment was tempered in Nebraska Press, which 
ruled out prior restraint as an option, but hinted at a more brutish solution: closing the 
courtroom to the press and public.
DePasquale: a “Flood Tide” of Closures
In July 1976, 42-year-old Wayne Clapp of Henrietta, New York, disappeared. He 
had been last seen on a boat at Seneca Lake. When police found the boat riddled with 
bullet holes and no sign of Clapp, they decided it was murder.127 After an intensive 
search, police arrested two males, 16 and 21, in Michigan. The 16-year-old’s wife was 
also arrested. Police recovered a murder weapon and Clapp’s truck in the area of the 
group’s arrest. Returned to New York, the two males faced murder, robbery, and grand 
larceny charges. The suspect’s wife was charged with grand larceny.128
127 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), 372. I have chosen to refer to this case by 




During this time, two New York papers owned by Gannett Co., the Democrat & 
Chronicle and the Times-Union, ran a series of articles detailing the arrests and 
investigation. The articles cited charging documents in which the defendants were 
accused of shooting Clapp on the boat with his own gun and weighing his body with 
anchors before tossing his body overboard, among other details.129
Before the trial, the defendants filed a motion to exclude the press and public from 
an evidence suppression hearing, claiming the “unabated buildup of adverse publicity” 
was going to ruin their chances of a fair trial.130 With no objection from the prosecution, 
Judge Daniel A. DePasquale granted the defense motion, ruling that the interest of the 
press and public was outweighed by the defendants’ right to a fair trial under the Sixth 
Amendment. Although DePasquale actually found the press had a constitutional right of 
access, he ruled that opening the suppression hearing would pose a reasonable probability 
of prejudice to the defendant, thus violating his Sixth Amendment rights, and granted the 
motion for closure.131 Gannett took legal action before the New York Supreme Court, 
arguing the press has a right to attend pretrial hearings under the First Amendment right 
of free press and the Sixth Amendment right of public trial, and lost.132 Gannett appealed 
129 Ibid., 372. Charging documents in the case stated the two males took Clapp’s credit card, gun, 
and truck. The papers noted that although police had dragged the lake, no body was found, 
making it the first murder case in New York state history to be tried without a body.
130 DePasquale, 372.
131 Ibid., 376.
132 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 55 App. Div. 2d 107, 389 N.Y.S. 2d 719 (1976).
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and the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in July 1979. In a 5-4 ruling, the 
Supreme Court held that the press has no affirmative right to attend pretrial hearings 
under the Constitution. The majority opinion, penned by Justice Potter Stewart, brought 
forward four points:
 The court has a duty to “safeguard” the due process rights of the accused.
 The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a public trial is for the benefit of the 
defendant and not the press.133
 Even if the Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment (which holds state 
laws to a constitutional standard) embodied a common-law right to attend 
criminal trials, it is not a constitutional right as is the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial.
 Even if, by argument, there is a constitutional right under the First and Fourteenth
amendments for the press to attend criminal trials, it has been given deference by 
the trial judge, who found the defendant’s interest outweighed that of the press.134
The ruling raised eyebrows in the legal community and stunned reporters. In reaction 
to the DePasquale decision, Allen H. Neuharth, chairman and president of Gannett, said:
This decision to permit the courts to lock the public out of the courtroom is 
another chilling demonstration that the majority of the Burger court is determined 
to unmake the Constitution.... This case is not simply a matter of free press versus 
fair trial. Rather, it is the Supreme Court saying that the judiciary is a private, 
Supreme Club, which can shut the door and conduct public business in private.135
Neuharth pointed out that because 90 percent of criminal indictments are settled in 
pretrial hearings, the public would only get a “10 percent peek” at what judges do.136
133 While noting this, Justice Stewart acknowledged a “strong societal interest in public trials.” 
However, members of the public who are not parties to the case have no enforceable right to 
attend.
134 DePasquale, 369-370.
135 James H. Rubin, Associated Press [Washington], July 2, 1979.
136 Ibid.
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Four justices joined in a dissenting opinion. In writing the dissent, Justice Harry 
A. Blackmun called the ruling “inflexible,” in that if the defense and prosecution merely 
agree to close hearings from the public the trial judge will likely go along with the 
motion. Blackmun differentiated the case from the previous cases of Sheppard and 
Murphy by pointing out that the reporters in this case were sticking to facts and not 
sensationalizing the case and accused the justices in the majority of over-coloring events 
to support their conclusions.137 Although the case was framed in argument as the First 
Amendment versus Sixth Amendment conflict, Blackmun noted that his fellow justices 
did not find any “First Amendment right of access to judicial or other government 
proceedings.” Instead, their argument rather turned on the Sixth Amendment to determine 
access.138 “The result is that the important interests of the public and the press (as part of 
that public) in open judicial proceedings are rejected and cast aside as of little value or 
significance,” Blackmun wrote.139
Several justices also filed supplemental concurring opinions in DePasquale to 
support the plurality ruling, some of which caused confusion by contradicting the 
plurality opinion. Chief Justice Warren Burger stressed the lack of common-law support 
for access to pretrial hearings, as opposed to trials themselves, which were supported by 
common law to be open to the public.140
137 DePasquale, 409.





trial is not a trial; it is a pretrial hearing.”141 Burger, however, left a substantial dangling 
question at the end of his concurring opinion. Burger pointed out that 85 percent of 
criminal cases were resolved before trial, mostly due to guilty pleas being entered as part 
of plea agreements with the prosecution.142 Burger failed to address the obvious: If 85 
percent of criminal cases are resolved before trial without the ability for the public or 
press to observe, just how transparent can justice be? Open courts advocate and legal 
scholar Susan Swift criticized the concurring justices after the ruling came down, 
pointing out the flawed logic in distinguishing between First Amendment right to access 
trials and Sixth Amendment right against access to pretrial hearings.143 Swift questioned 
why Justice Stewart would write that press access to trials helps guard against judicial 
and prosecutorial malfeasance, while overlooking the same need in pretrial hearings.144
Swift noted that, in particular, evidentiary suppression hearings do pit a defendant’s right 
to a fair trial against public access interests, but given the realities of pretrial publicity 
and ensuring fair due process, she argued ensuring fair due process through public 
observation was the more important.145
Publication of inadmissible evidence subverts the function of the hearing. At the 
same time, the public has a legitimate right to the information which is made 
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prosecutorial lawbreaking is received in court.146
Justice William H. Rehnquist caused the most confusion with his concurring 
opinion, in which he lumped pretrial hearings and trials in the same category, stating that 
if both the prosecution and defense agree, “the trial court is not required by the Sixth 
Amendment to advance any reason whatsoever for declining to open a pretrial hearing or 
trial to the public.”147
Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., while supporting the majority opinion by concurring, 
wrote an opinion that was clearly dissenting in nature. He plainly stated that while an 
access right by the press did not exist under the Sixth Amendment because the right of a 
public trial was solely for the defendant, one did exist under the First Amendment under 
the legal theory of an informed populace, and he called for a clear balancing test that the 
courts could use to determine closure. Citing the court’s decisions in Estes, Sheppard and 
Nebraska Press, Powell noted the need for additional direction to the lower courts.
Rehnquist insisted there was no right of access under the First 
Amendment and, therefore, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial would 
override a claim of access. This blurring of the distinction between trial and pretrial 
would prove problematic to judges who attempted to interpret and apply the ruling in 
their courts (something which will soon be discussed in this thesis). In fact, Rehnquist 
mentioned “trial” with “pretrial” several times in his opinion.
Powell said it was clear from Nebraska Press that there is a “strong presumption” 
against prior restraint in prohibiting the publication of courtroom proceedings. Powell 
146 Ibid., 291.
147 DePasquale, 405 (Bold words, “or trial,” are author’s emphasis).
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saw the conflict as a strict balancing test between free press and fair trial, “an 
accommodation under which neither defendant’s rights nor the rights of members of the 
press and public should be made subordinate.”148 In other words, neither constitutional 
interest would be given preference right off of the bat. The exact question then for a trial 
judge to consider, Powell surmised, is: Would pretrial publicity likely jeopardize a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial?149 Thus, when a defendant requests closure, a judge must 
consider alternative means, but the burden of showing those means is upon the press. 
Likewise, the burden is upon the defendant to justify closure due to likely prejudice being 
produced if hearing is kept open. The state may also join a request for closure, but it must 
show that keeping a hearing open would interfere with fair proceedings and preservation 
of confidential information. Upon request for closure, the press must immediately object, 
but later be given a chance to be heard. If a judge grants closure, the ruling must be 
narrowly tailored as to not unnecessarily interfere with the right of access. The ruling 
must also be narrow in terms of time with an eventual plan to release court transcripts 
once threat of prejudice has passed.150
Ironically, Powell’s dissenting voice in DePasquale was never heard in Richmond
because he abstained from the case. It gives one pause to think that, had Powell been able 
to participate in Richmond, whether his call for a clear test, and suggested framework, 





when members of the press seemed embattled against government secrecy.
The years leading up to 1979 were filled with social and political upheaval. A 
broader look at the period before the DePasquale decision deserves brief discussion. The 
nation had just come out of the conflict in Vietnam, soured by an extended military 
campaign that cost many American military lives. In 1971, The New York Times and 
Washington Post published a series of articles based on a secret Pentagon study of the 
Vietnam War, dubbed the Pentagon Papers. The study indicated that both Republican and 
Democratic administrations had misled the public about the country’s objectives in 
Southeast Asia. Under the guidance of the Richard M. Nixon administration, the U.S. 
Department of Justice petitioned the federal court to enjoin both papers from further 
publication of the Pentagon Papers, citing national security. In a 6-3 decision, the 
Supreme Court ruled the government had not provided a compelling interest to override a 
“heavy burden” to justify prior restraint, as Justice William J. Brennan wrote.151 In the 
years following, the Nixon administration turned its sights on journalists themselves. 
Between 1970 and 1972, the Justice Department subpoenaed several journalists in an 
effort to have them divulge confidential information and sources.152
151 New York Times v. U.S., 713 U.S. 403 (1971), 714.
Several journalists 
were jailed for failure to comply. Some subpoenas involved investigations into leaks of 
classified information within the federal government, while others were federal 
investigations into the Black Panthers organization. By 1972 and 1974, news 
152 Edward Knappman, Government and the Media in Conflict 1970-74 (New York: Facts on File, 
1974), 115-21.
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organizations were dealing with warrants and subpoenas demanding searches of 
newsrooms and newsroom phone records.153
Also in 1972, the press uncovered the Watergate scandal. Burglars had broken into 
the Democratic National Committee’s headquarters at the Watergate office complex in 
Washington, D.C. The suspects were linked back to the Nixon White House and the 
scandal led to Nixon’s resignation in August 1974.154
In this context, the irony of the DePasquale ruling did not escape those opposed 
to it. The American Civil Liberties Union issued a statement after the ruling was issued: 
“Had this decision taken place before or during Watergate, the press might not have been 
able to report on Judge [John] Sirica’s questioning of the Watergate burglars, which 
changed the course of history.”155 Given that judges were forcing journalists to testify 
before grand juries, turn over evidence at criminal trials, and open their newsrooms to 
police with search warrants, CBS law correspondent Fred Graham said, “The judges 
seem determined to show that they are boss.”156
153 Ibid.
Columbia University law professor 
Benno Schmidt, Jr., suggested that the press should simply deal with it: “The press’s
adverse reaction is grossly exaggerated....The Court has not been protective of news 
154 See, e.g., Keith W. Olson, Watergate: The Presidential Scandal that Shook America
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2003).
155 Aric Press with Diane Camper in Washington and bureau reports, “Court vs. the Press,” 
Newsweek, July 16, 1979.
156 Ibid.
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gathering, but no court has ever been.”157
It was only a matter of weeks before state and federal judges began applying 
DePasquale as they saw fit. Just over two weeks from the day of the ruling’s release a 
judge in Anne Arundel County, Maryland, cited the Supreme Court ruling when he 
ordered a criminal pretrial court hearing in the case of a man charged with arson closed to 
the public.158 Circuit Court Judge E. Mackall Chiles said he had “no alternative” but to 
grant the defense’s motion because pretrial publicity would have a negative effect on the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.159 The prosecution in the case argued it was a public 
matter and that any bias by prospective jurors could be handled through the jury selection 
process. When The Annapolis Evening Capital reporter, Scott Lebar, returned for the 
afternoon session, the judge had ordered the hearing closed. Chiles told Lebar he could 
state his objections right then but would not grant him time to contact the paper’s
attorney. Chiles also issued a gag order, prohibiting anyone involved in the case from 
commenting to the press about the case.160
Across the country, reports of judges closing more than just pretrial hearings 
began to surface. The New York Times reported that a New York federal judge sentenced a 
157 Ibid.
158 Saundra Saperstein, “Judge Shuts Maryland Pretrial Hearing; Controversial Supreme Court 
Ruling Invoked,” The Washington Post, July 19, 1979, A, 1.
159 Ibid. While understanding the reasoning behind the judge’s decision would prove insightful, 
typically lower-court cases are not published in case reporters, or made available in general 
case databases. Effort to travel to the courthouse in Maryland and seek the physical case file 
could be undertaken, but  many criminal case files, unless the subject of a major appeal, are 
typically expunged and destroyed.
160 Saperstein.
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man “in secret” and, on three other occasions, judges dismissed court reporters but 
allowed other members of the public to remain.161
The South Dakota Supreme Court, meanwhile, took DePasquale to its ultimate 
conclusion, ruling in September 1979 that the public had no right to be present at any part 
of a criminal trial. The state justices cited DePasquale as a reason for their ruling.162
According to the ruling, justices found the case before them “strikingly similar” to the 
DePasquale case.163 Bolstered by the lack of access right in Houchins, South Dakota 
justices wrote that it was clear in DePasquale that there was no right of access to trials.164
One Illinois defense attorney also argued in September 1979 that the press should be 
thrown out if there was any doubt that it would affect the trial of a man accused of 
deviate sexual assault. “If there is doubt in the court’s mind the defendant can get a fair 
trial, then the court should be more concerned about the rights of the defendant than the 
rights of the press,” defense attorney Terry Fields was quoted as saying.165
161 Editorial, “The Open Disarray of Closed Justice,” The New York Times, August 18, 1979, 18. 
This editorial also described actions across the country as “an epidemic of court closings 
across the country.”
Unfortunately 
for Fields, the judge denied the motion. The judge said the Supreme Court case left it up 
to the judge’s discretion to make the closure decision. “I’m using that discretion to deny 
this motion,” said Judge Daniel Dailey, who found the intention of Illinois law was to 
162 Eric Newhouse, Associated Press, September 26, 1979, Domestic News.
163 Ibid.
164 Rapid City Journal v. The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial District, 283 N.W. 2d 563 
(1979).
165 Associated Press [Hillsboro, Ill.], September 13, 1979, Domestic News.
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keep trials and courtrooms open.166
Other attorneys also said they believed keeping justice public was important to the 
system. “We believe that the press and public should be at every trial, every pretrial 
hearing, any court action. We do not believe in secret proceedings,” said Bronx District 
Attorney Mario Merola, who at the time was fighting the closure of a trial regarding a 13-
year-old charged with the robbery-murder of a 19-year-old man on a New York City 
subway platform. When asked why, Merola reportedly said the DePasquale ruling needed 
clarifying as to when hearings can be closed.167 In Tennessee, a Chattanooga judge 
rejected a request by the convicted killer of a policeman to close his sentencing hearing in 
which he faced the death penalty.168 While the defense cited DePasquale for its 
supporting reason, the state and local newspaper, The Chattanooga Times, reminded the 
court that the Supreme Court decision dealt specifically with pretrial hearings and not 
sentencing hearings, which are post-trial. However, the defendant’s attorney argued that 
DePasquale did encompass such hearings.169 Criminal Court Judge Joe DiRisio sided 
with the paper’s interpretation of DePasquale and accepted its argument that its right to 
send a reporter was also supported by the First Amendment.170
These instances in support of openness appeared to have been overshadowed by 
166 People v. Levine, 55 Ill. Dec. 240 (1978).
167 Richard T. Pienciak, Associated Press, Sept. 27, 1979, Domestic News.
168 584 S.W. 2d 765 (1979).
169 “Judge Rules That Killer’s Sentencing Hearing Should be Public,” The Associated Press,
March 28, 1980, Domestic News.
170 Ibid.
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judges and other attorneys who seemed to need little reason to kick out the press. The 
New York Times reported that one month after DePasquale was issued, there were about 
thirty motions for court closure across the country. Three months out, that number had 
grown to fifty-eight motions. “It becomes a flood tide where defense lawyers feel 
obligated to make a motion to close to protect themselves from whatever they have in 
their imaginations,” said Gannett attorney Alice Lucan.171
I have nothing to do with reporters’ lunch hours....Nobody has given me a 
schedule, and if they did this court is not going to drop its schedule to fit 
newspapers. The purpose of this court is to see that justice is done.
That same article reported that 
Albany County Judge Joseph Harris had recently unsealed a grand jury indictment, 
arraigned a criminal defendant during the lunch hour when reporters were away, then 
resealed the indictment and instituted a gag order, instructing attorneys in the case not to 
comment. When asked to comment, Harris said:
172
The American Society of Newspaper Editors revealed at its April 1980 meeting 
that 239 motions to bar the public and press from court hearings had been filed since 
DePasquale.173
171 Charlotte Evans, “Rising Number of Court Cases Closed to Press,” The New York Times,
October 13, 1979, 21.
Among some 850 daily newspaper editors attending the meeting, heads 
of some the nation’s top papers expressed concern. Denver Post editor William H. 
Hornby envisioned a “never-ending battle” for the press and said his paper had fought to 
keep four trials open to the public through legal action. Louis Boccardi, executive 
172 Ibid.
173 Deirdre Carmody, “Newspapers Debating Effect of Court Rulings On Their Operations: 
Newspapers Debate Rulings’ Effect Upon Operations ‘A Dampening Effect’ A Never-Ending 
Battle Ordered Not to Write Nuisance Lawsuits,” The New York Times, April 7, 1980, A, 1.
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director of The Associated Press, reported seeing a troubling increase in cases where the
press and public were allowed to attend court hearings, but judges were ordering the 
press not to write about what they had seen or heard. Boccardi added he was aware that in 
most of those instances, the court’s orders had been reversed.174 Editors at the meeting 
said they had begun giving reporters “wallet-sized” cards with statements that could be 
read aloud in court, stating their organization’s objection to a court closure, given 
incidents of judges closing hearings without giving the press a chance to take legal 
action.175 Such actions by judges went against the Supreme Court’s ruling in DePasquale,
which specifically stated the press had a right to have its legal objections heard by the 
court. The custom of having reporters carry cards with legal statements still continues 
today.176
By July 1980, the number of motions to close criminal proceedings had swelled to
286, with fourteen more closures by November of that year.177 Of those motions, 161 
were enforced or upheld on appeal, while 125 were eventually denied or withdrawn by 
the filing party. Fourteen of the 300 motions were direct prior restraint by the judge.178
174 Ibid.
“Proceedings are being sealed for such reasons as embarrassment to witnesses or 
175 Ibid.
176 This author has taken the opportunity to hand out such cards to journalists as part of a program 
being run by the Society of Professional Journalists.
177 The Reporters Committee on Freedom of the Press, “Court Watch Summary” (Washington 
D.C.: November 18, 1980).
178 Ibid.
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defendants – in addition, to prejudice the defendant’s right to obtain an impartial jury,” 
was the conclusion of the court closure study conducted by The Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press.179
It did not take long for the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court to realize their 
decision was causing great confusion among the judiciary. It is rare for Supreme Court 
justices to make public comment, and even more rare for them to comment on cases they 
have settled on. But in the months following DePasquale five of the nine justices 
commented publicly on the decision.
While the argument of a defendant’s right to a fair trial had been 
accepted by the Supreme Court as a valid reason for closure, nowhere in DePasquale, or 
prior rulings involving access, had an argument been made that a court hearing could be 
closed for the reason of preventing embarrassment.
180 Among them was Chief Justice Burger, who in an 
interview with the press, said judges had been misinterpreting the ruling and that 
DePasquale was limited to pretrial hearings only.181 In a fatal attempt at humor, Burger  
was quoted in an editorial that many judges were “misreading” the decision. “Maybe the 
judges are reading newspaper reports of what we said,” Burger said. The New York Times
failed to see the humor: “That comment, while possibly an example of judicial humor, 
adds to our dual burden of trying to report the news while arguing for access to the 
forums of justice,” the editors wrote.182
179 Ibid., accompanying letter by Reporters Committee director Jack C. Landau.
180 Ed Cony, “The Growth of Secret Trials,” Wall Street Journal, December 17, 1979, 24.
181 Linda Greenhouse, “Stevens Says Closed Trials May Justify New Laws,” The New York 
Times, September 9, 1979, 41.
182 Editorial, “The Open Disarray of Closed Justice,” The New York Times, August 18, 1979, 18.
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Justice Powell was quoted as saying he had no hostility toward the press during a 
meeting of the American Bar Association in Dallas in August 1979. “We are totally 
dependent on the media to interpret what we do. That’s all the public knows about us. 
Instead of having any hostility toward you, we depend upon you very much,” Powell 
said.183 While not indicating that the ruling had any causality with court closures going 
on across the country, Powell did point out DePasquale did not settle the issue of the 
right of press access under the First Amendment.184
Speaking at the dedication to the new law school at the University of Arizona that 
September, Justice John Paul Stevens, who also supported the majority opinion in 
DePasquale, admitted that judges might be too casual in granting motions for closure. As 
a possible remedy to the ruling he supported, Stevens suggested in his speech that new 
laws could be passed to rectify the situation, but added that journalists who saw the ruling 
as “removing the cornerstone” of the Constitution were mistaken.
Powell had supported the majority 
opinion, but urged a look at a right under the First Amendment and the construction of a 
legal test for a right of access.
185 A month before 
Stevens’s comment, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, who wrote the dissent in the case, made 
a public statement that the decision did authorize the closing of full trials to the public 
183 Linda Greenhouse, “Powell Says Court Has No Hostility Toward Press,” The New York Times,
August 14, 1979, A, 13.
184 Ibid.
185 Linda Greenhouse, “Stevens Says Closed Trials May Justify New Laws,” The New York 
Times, September 9, 1979, 41.
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and press.186
On Oct. 9, 1979, only three months after its decision in DePasquale, and with no 
indication that it had perhaps made a mistake, the Supreme Court announced it had 
agreed to hear another court closure case: Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia.187 It would 
be another nine months before a decision would be reached. During that time, the press 
would fight to keep numerous judges from closing hearings across the country.
Richmond v. Virginia: Washing Away the Graffiti
As murder trials went, Richmond had an unusual series of legal snags. In March 
1976, a Virginia man was indicted for the murder of a hotel manager who had been found 
stabbed to death the previous December. The suspect was promptly tried and convicted 
and, had it not been for a bloodstained shirt, the media case that sprung from the trial 
never would have reached up to the Supreme Court. The shirt, which the prosecution 
claimed belonged to the defendant, had been improperly admitted into evidence. The 
Virginia Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.188
The case was tried again in the same court, but ended in a mistrial in May 1978 
when a juror asked to be excused and no alternate was available.189
186 Ibid.
During a third trial in 
187 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (BURGER, C.J., Opinion of the Court), 448 U.S. 555 
(1980).
188 Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 237 S.E. 2d 779.
189 Ibid.
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June of that year, a prospective juror allegedly tainted the jury pool during jury selection 
by telling others about a newspaper article the juror had read, which recounted the 
defendant’s past two trials.190 In the fourth trial, the judge in the case granted a defense 
motion to clear the courtroom of spectators, including the press.191 The defense had 
argued that this was the fourth time its client was being tried and it did not want 
information, perhaps inaccurate information, to “leak out” via the press because the area 
was “a small community.”192
Instead of laying down a sound legal argument, the trial judge blamed the size of 
the courtroom:
I think that having people in the courtroom is distracting to the jury. Now, we 
have to have certain people in here and maybe that’s not a very good reason. 
When we get into our new court building, people can sit in the audience so the 
jury can’t see them. The rule of the court may be different under those 
circumstances.193
The fourth trial was held behind closed doors and the defendant was found not 
guilty of murder after the defense made a motion to strike the state’s evidence. Richmond 
Newspapers appealed the closure to the Virginia Supreme Court, which dismissed the 
paper’s appeal, finding in a one-page ruling that the lower court’s decision went along 
with DePasquale.194 The case went on to the U.S. Supreme Court.195
190 Stevenson, as cited in Richmond, 560.
191 Richmond, 560. This judge had presided over the last three trials.
192 Ibid., 562.
193 Ibid.
194 Richmond Newspapers v. Commonwealth, 5 Media L. Rep. 1545; Virginia Supreme Court 
record no. 781598 (1979).
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On July 2, 1980, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Richmond and signaled 
a dramatic turn in the tone it had taken toward the press in DePasquale. The High Court 
found there was indeed a constitutional right of the press to attend criminal trials.196
In the majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Warren Burger and supported by 
Justices Byron White and John Paul Stevens, the court settled on four areas to support an 
implied constitutional right to access. First, they found that there has been historically a 
tradition of open courts in both British and American colonial courts. Second, the
courtroom is considered a public place under the First Amendment right to assembly and 
public participation in governance. Third, freedom to attend criminal trials is necessary to 
protect free speech, and fourth, alternative solutions to controlling pretrial publicity can 
be sought that are less harmful to the First Amendment right.
To 
complicate matters, there were six separate opinions, five of which supported the 
majority opinion.
197
Burger noted that throughout the histories of English and colonial law, members 
of the public attended trials and at times it was compulsory:198
195 It is interesting to note that the attorneys for the state of Virginia argued the petition by 
Richmond Newspapers was moot because the findings of the court were later released. 
However, the Supreme Court justices stated they took the case because “it is reasonably 
foreseeable that other trials may be closed by other judges without any more showing of need 
than is presented on this record.” Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (BURGER, C.J., 





The historical evidence demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our 
organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been 
presumptively open. This is no quirk of history; rather, it has long been 
recognized as an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American trial.199
The open criminal trial goes beyond the purpose of the process. Burger noted that 
when a “shocking” crime happens, the community reacts with outrage.200 A public trial 
provides an “outlet” for the community with the awareness that society is responding in 
an appropriate way.201 It also prevents the “self-help” of vigilantes.202 Burger cited a 
previous Supreme Court ruling stating, “The appearance of justice can best be provided 
by allowing people to observe it.”203 In a nod toward contemporary times, Burger wrote 
that most of the public is too busy to attend criminal trials and must rely on the press to 
function as “surrogates for the public.”204
While Virginia had argued the right of access to government is not stated in the 
Constitution, Burger reminded that the Constitution was not a limit on freedoms and  
many other important rights that derive from the Constitution were also not listed, such 
as:





203 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954), as cited in Richmond, 572.
204 Richmond, 574.
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 The right to be presumed innocent.
 The right to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
 The right to travel.205
Justices who dissented in DePasquale took the opportunity to file concurring 
opinions vindicating their previous protest. Justice White wrote a concurring opinion in 
which he noted that the Richmond ruling would have been “uncecessary” had the High 
Court not construed the Sixth Amendment allowing the public to be excluded from 
criminal proceedings.206 Justice Thurgood Marshall, who established that jurors need not 
be tainted by press coverage in Murphy, joined Justice William Brennan in supporting a 
constitutional right of access, but qualified that right with the government’s right to limit 
information for reasons of security or confidentiality.207
Justice Stevens hailed the ruling as a “watershed case” in holding the right to 
gather information as constitutionally protected.208 It was Justice Harry Blackmun who 
seemed to indicate the High Court was remedying a wrong with the Richmond decision: 
“It is gratifying...to see the Court wash away at least some of the graffiti that marred the 
prevailing opinions in Gannett [v. DePasquale].”209
Only one justice truly disagreed with his colleagues on the bench. It was the same 







under the Sixth Amendment in addition to pretrial hearings. In a curious but brief 
dissenting opinion, Justice William Rehnquist wrote that if the prosecution and defense 
agreed, courts should be closed to the public because no such right of access is spelled 
out in the Constitution. The dissent was lean on case law citations, and began with a 
quote from the Gilbert and Sullivan operetta “Iolanthe,” something of a first for Supreme 
Court opinions.210 Yet his diverging dicta wouldn’t be the last.211
Within the newsrooms of the daily papers, members of the press seemed to 
breathe a collective sigh of relief. “Any list of instances in which a judge can now close a 
trial will be a very limited list,” said Harvard Law professor Laurence Tribe, who argued 
the case on behalf of Richmond Newspapers.212 Vindicated by the decision, Richmond 
Newspapers took the Supreme Court ruling and filed a challenge in the Virginia Supreme 
Court, asking the court to order an evidentiary hearing in the originating murder case to 
review facts and ensure that all “interested parties” be heard.213
The New York Times hailed the decision, making reference to Justice Blackmun’s
opinion:
Every time the Supreme Court looks back at its 1979 decision allowing a
210 Ibid., 605. In the play, the Lord Chancellor recites: “The Law is the true embodiment of 
everything that’s excellent, It has no kind of fault or flaw, And I, my Lords, embody the Law.”
211 See Justice Rehnquist’s verbose dissenting opinion in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1988), 
421.
212 Stephen Wermiel, “High Court Bars Closing of Trials In Criminal Cases: Public and Press Are 
Found To Have Right to Attend Under First Amendment,” The Wall Street Journal, July 3, 
1980, 4.
213 “Richmond Papers Appeal Ruling On Closing of Pretrial Hearings,” UPI [Richmond, Va.], 
August 4, 1980.
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courtroom to be closed for pretrial hearings on evidence, it seems to regret it.... 
More graffiti has now come off, exposing the error of the original decision.214
The paper went on to say that the Supreme Court “has reasserted the obvious,” but 
the editors called for more to be done to ensure openness in the future: “The cleanup is 
well begun, but not yet done.”215
Jack C. Landau, director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 
said he hoped the case planted an “initial seed” that would grow into a larger 
constitutional right to access all kinds of government information.
This hints at the court’s fractured ruling and lack of 
singular voice. Journalists were calling for further clarity regarding when a judge could
close a trial.
216
The day after the Richmond decision The New York Times columnist Anthony 
Lewis pointed out the importance of the press in modern society:
We are not in an age, any longer, when the test of the First Amendment is the 
freedom of the street corner orator. We live in a complex society, with a 
Government of immense powers that a democratic republic can hope to control 
only if it is able to learn the facts in some depth and detail. Accountability, the 
principle at the heart of the American Constitution, more than ever requires 
information.217
Members of the press seemed eager to see the right of access expanded to cover 
214 Editorial, “Wiping the Graffiti Off the Courtroom,” The New York Times, July 3, 1980, A, 18. 
Editorial, “The Writing on the Courtroom Wall,” The New York Times, May 28, 1984, A, 22.
215 Ibid.
216 Deirdre Carmody, “Court’s Ruling on Open Trial: Some Feel It Establishes a Right to Gather 
News and May Help to Open Government to the Public News Analysis New Ground Broken 
Big Change in View Initial Seed Planted Media Claim Seen Validated,” The New York Times,
July 10, 1980, B, 20.
217 Anthony Lewis, “A Right to Be Informed,” The New York Times, July 3, 1980, A, 19.
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other government entities.
Several months later, a federal judge in Los Angeles would illustrate that not 
every judge was apt to follow the spirit of Richmond. In October 1980, U.S. District 
Judge Terry Hatter announced that he refused to promise that the trial of five reputed 
organized crime members would be held in public. Hatter lashed out at the suggestion of 
the Supreme Court in Richmond to sequester a jury as an alternate remedy to closing his 
courtroom. He would not “take people and remove them from their families so the 
newspapers can sell ads and advertising on television.”218 Hatter said he believed the 
British system of limiting pretrial information was superior to the U.S. system.219
218 Associated Press [Los Angeles, Ca.], October 22, 1980.
219 Ibid.
CHAPTER V
POST-RICHMOND PROGRESS AND DISCUSSION OF ONGOING
PROBLEMS AND A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
In the six years following Richmond the Supreme Court expanded the right of 
access to court hearings. In 1982 the High Court struck down a Massachusetts law, 
stating the press and public had a right to observe the testimony of minor victims in 
sexual offense cases.220 The year 1984 saw the Court decide two more key cases, 
establishing a constitutional right of access for jury selection (voir dire)221 and, for the 
first time, a right of access to pretrial hearings, specifically evidentiary suppression 
hearings.222 Then in 1986, the Supreme Court built upon its previous 1984 ruling in 
Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County by not only adding an 
access right to preliminary hearings, but also adding stronger language to state there is a 
qualified right of access to criminal proceedings under the First Amendment.223
It is clear the Richmond ruling paved the way for the evolution of access theory 
for courts. Yet, as Judge Alfred T. Goodwin so aptly put it, the “shotgun wedding” 
220 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
221 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
222 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
223 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County, 478 U.S. 1 (1985), 9. 
Although this decision was released in 1986, it was published as part of the court’s 1985 
session. Thus, the citation does not reflect the actual release date.
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between the press and the courts continues.224 Attitudes about press presence in 
courtrooms appear to remain contentious. Over the years judges and court officials have 
attempted to be creative in removing the press from courtrooms. In Oklahoma, four out of 
eight state drug and mental health court judges cited medical privacy laws in closing 
court hearings, even though state law does not say the hearings should be closed, and 
federal officials say HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) does 
not apply to the courts.225 Although the Oklahoma state judge who helped establish the 
special mental health court system said the specific state law that created the special 
courts did not require closed hearings, other state judges said they were concerned certain 
information being discussed in open court could embarrass participants.226
In 2007, a North Dakota district judge, presiding over the murder trial of a former 
corrections officer accused of murdering a 22-year-old woman in her apartment, closed 
the courtroom several times during the trial so jurors could ask him questions before 
being dismissed for the day.
By citing 
HIPAA, judges avoid the burden of having to create a formal ruling in which they have to 
weigh constitutional interests.
227 Traditionally, these events are held before the public.228
224 See note 56.
225 “Judges Increasingly Closing Public Access to Courts,” The Associated Press [Tulsa, Ok.], 
September 3, 2007.
226 Ibid.
227 Dale Wetzel, “Judge Closes Hearing in Gibbs Case, Wonders if Jury Deadlocked,” The 
Associated Press [N.D.], July 12, 2007.
228 See Richmond.
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Ironically this behavior was noticed by a local television reporter, who was asked by the 
court to help start a video player for the jury because it appeared no one in the courtroom 
could operate it. She was then asked to leave.229
Even during one of the largest financial scandals in U.S. history, a federal judge 
was caught holding at least three closed-door hearings with federal prosecutors and 
defense attorneys representing three former Enron executives, charged with a variety of 
felony crimes, in 2003.230 The Houston Chronicle had to spend money to hire attorneys to 
get U.S. District Judge Kenneth Hoyt to unseal transcripts of the hearings. In the 
transcripts, Hoyt gave his reason for sealing the hearings: “There are matters that do not
need to be discussed in public in ways that embarrasses or humiliates the government or 
the defense and particularly the court.”231 Publicly, Houston Chronicle editor Jeff Cohen 
responded by stating, “there’s no embarrassment exception to the First Amendment.”232
One month later, a panel of 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals judges denied the Houston 
Chronicle’s appeal in a one-page slip opinion that offered no explanation.233
Prosecutors at times push the limits of denying access, although the Supreme 
Court has stated the protection of the judicial process is a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
229 Wetzel.
230 Mark Fitzgerald, “Houson: We Have a Problem,” Editor & Publisher 136, no. 31, September 8 
(2003): 6.
231 In Re:Houston Chronicle Publishing Company, No. 03-20856, Slip Op. (5th Cir. 2003).
232 Fitzgerald.
233 In Re:Houston Chronicle Publishing Company. A slip opinion is simply a paragraph or 
sentence stating a court’s decision without offering any explanation as to its reasoning.
67
right. In 1997 the San Diego Union-Tribune brought public attention to a federal judge 
who ordered the press and public to be removed from the courtroom and placed in a room 
with a closed-circuit audio speaker to protect the identity of a federal confidential 
informant who was going to testify in a money-laundering case.234 Court officials did not 
seem to care that the audio was sometimes inaudible and it was reported that the plug on 
the sound system was “yanked out several times to avoid mention of the informant’s
name.”235
I argue the answer to these questions resides in two issues: 1) Bad precedent 
between 1979 and 1980, the period between DePasquale and Richmond; 2) The 
confusion of six separate opinions in Richmond, which left some judges a way to skirt a 
developing access right and left all judges with a lack of clear guidance. In looking at the 
Richmond opinions one permeating question surfaces: How does a First-Amendment 
right of access square with a Sixth-Amendment right to a fair trial? Perhaps the missing 
voice of one justice could shed some light. In his dissenting opinion in DePasquale,
Justice Lewis Powell created the framework for a legal test for court access. However, his 
The presiding federal judge stated that protecting the informant’s identity was 
more important than public access. These cases raise two key questions: Why are judges 
so quick to override a constitutionally-protected interest for interests that are not even 
constitutional? Is it for the sake of protecting prosecution witnesses, or to spare the 
potential for embarrassment to the officers of the court?
234 U.S. v. Ruben Leos-Hermosillo, No. CR-97-01221 (United States District Court for the 
Southern District of California 1997).
235 “Court Closed to Shield Informant,” Editor & Publisher 130, no. 50, December 13 (1997): 36.
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work was left unfinished in Richmond due to his recusal, denying what could have been a 
rallying beacon for his fellow justices to create a clear test for access. In his dissent, 
Powell begins by noting that imposing prior restraint on what the press reports is not a 
viable option under the reasoning of Nebraska Press.236 Also, the public has the same 
level of interest in access to pretrial hearings as they do trials, but under Houchins,237 that 
right should be qualified. Powell then called for an equal balancing of a First-Amendment 
right of access against a Sixth-Amendment right to fair trial, and that the defendant must 
show that pretrial publicity is likely to prejudice a jury. Also, the press must object to the 
motion for closure immediately in order to invoke its interest. The court must then give 
reasonable time for the press to be heard on the motion. The burden is upon the press to 
show the court alternative means to apply that would not preclude access to the 
hearing.238 The state may join in the motion for closure, but must show possible 
interference with fair proceedings and preserve confidential information as needed.239 If a 
judge decides to close the hearing, the court must satisfy two key elements: 1) The ruling 
for closure must not be overbroad as to unnecessarily impinge upon the public’s access 
right; 2) The time period of closure to access must expire when the threat of publicity has 
passed and public access to court transcripts can be restored.240
236 DePasquale, 398.
237 Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978).




As groundbreaking as Richmond was, Powell’s framework was overlooked in the 
six concurring opinions, but resurfaced in the majority opinions of the Press-Enterprise
cases in 1984 and 1986. This time, the majority of justices embraced a similar 
framework, with some marked changes. The High Court increased the burden of the 
defendant to prove prejudice; this time with a “substantial probability” standard instead 
of a “likely” one.241 This made it more difficult to justify closing a hearing. The burden 
was lifted off the public and press to show alternative means, and placed on the presiding
judge.242 Any finding of closure must be narrowly tailored by the court as to avoid 
unnecessarily impinging upon the public’s right of access. For the first time, the public 
was found to have a qualified right to access pretrial hearings and equal interest in them, 
almost on level with trials: “Other courts have noted that some pretrial proceedings have 
no historical counterpart, but, given the importance of the pretrial proceeding to the 
criminal trial, the traditional right of access should still apply.”243
However, some elements of Powell’s DePasquale framework were missing –
notably, the right of the press and public to immediately object to a motion for closure
and the requirement of the judge to set a time limit on the closure order. The omission of 
these elements contributes to what has become a patchwork of guidelines issued by the 
Supreme Court regarding court access. What is needed is a more unified and clear test 
that judges, and the press, can point to for guidance. By taking elements from Powell’s




dissenting test in DePasquale and merging them with elements from the Press-Enterprise
rulings, a more legitimate constitutional test can be created. Before reaching this unified 
test, some contemporary issues of court access exemplify the need for such a test.
Much like in the case of Sheppard, at times a court case can be the focus of 
national, and sometimes international, media attention. These cases prove particularly 
difficult to manage given the number of interested parties. Courtroom parking lots and 
seats can easily be filled by satellite trucks and reporters.244 A Los Angeles court 
commissioner found it easier to hold a quick closed-door custody hearing with attorneys 
for pop star Britney Spears rather than deal with the presence of the press.245 By the time 
the press finds out about the hearing and then takes steps to object, the hearing may have 
been days, or weeks, past. A new solution by some court officials is to charge the press 
for the inconvenience of accommodating them. During the child molestation trial of pop 
legend Michael Jackson, court officials billed attending media outlets about $7,500 a day 
(15 percent of operating costs) as an “impact fee” for additional security staffing, a 
closed-circuit viewing room, and garbage pickup.246
244 As a college intern for ABC News, this author witnessed a “media circus” environment while 
helping to cover the trial of Lorena Bobbitt, who was accused of emasculating her husband 
with a knife. Court officials struggled with the sheer number of spectators in addition to 
providing security for the building. A certain number of press were allowed in the courtroom 
during the trial, while late-comers were housed in an adjacent building with closed-circuit 
video provided.
Although several media 
organizations went along with the decision and paid the bill, court officials said access to 
245 Linda Deutsch, “Lawyers Huddle Behind Closed Court Door in Spears Custody Case,” The 
Associated Press [Los Angeles, Ca.], February 4, 2008.
246 Corey Pein, “Celebrity Justice,” Columbia Journalism Review, November/December (2004): 
23.
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the trial was unrelated to those who paid. However, some reporters, including one from 
The Washington Post, noted that it was common knowledge that those who paid got in-
courtroom seating.247 The previous example is particularly troubling because it moves 
dangerously close to unconstitutional pay-for-access behavior. This violates the premise 
many Supreme Court justices have established: that the courtroom should be considered a 
“public place” much like parks and sidewalks.248
The act of requiring press organizations to purchase coverage of high-profile trials
is troubling. Equally so, the expense for the press to hire attorneys each time a judge, or 
attorney, moves to close a hearing is wholly unacceptable. It violates the very spirit of the 
Constitution and the concept of public participation and access to government. Right-to-
know scholar Herbert Foerstel argued that the Supreme Court needs to go one step 
beyond a qualified right to making the right of access to courts, and government, an 
affirmative right.249 This means government should go beyond reacting when a citizen 
asserts the right of access, but to move on its own accord in anticipation of public access. 
Even legal scholar Lillian BeVier, who was skeptical about the Supreme Court finding a 
constitutional right of access, acknowledged that there is affirmative value in an informed 
public.250
247 Ibid.
Many other legal scholars have also called for a clear balancing test for court 
248 In writing about the tradition of open trials in Richmond, Justices Burger (p. 571, 578), White 
(p. 581, Note 18), Brennan (p. 587, 589), and Stewart (p. 599) all mention the history of the 
courtroom being an open space accessible by the public.
249 See note 26.
250 BeVier (note 29), 493.
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access, citing confusion in Richmond that resulting rulings have not fully remedied.251
1. The right of the public to attend court hearings, whether pretrial, trial 
or post-trial, is an affirmative right, unless proven otherwise by clear 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
As 
discussed earlier in this section, I propose a unified balancing test, taking elements from 
both Press-Enterprise decisions and adding lost elements from Justice Powell’s dissent in 
DePasquale. Thus, the Court Access Test has six prongs. A judge considering closure 
must meet all six prongs to constitutionally prevent the public/press from attending:
2. A judge must demonstrate that a movant seeking closure has shown a 
substantial probability that publicity of the hearing would result in 
prejudicial harm.
3. Any attending member of the public has the right to immediately 
object to a motion for closure, and has a right be heard.
4. A judge must demonstrate that alternative means to closing a hearing 
have been considered.
5. Any finding of warranted closure must be narrowly tailored in scope.
6. Any closure order must also be narrowly tailored to be imposed only 
within the time frame in which the threat of harm exists.
Prong One
As mentioned, some legal scholars see value in considering the right of access as 
an affirmative right. A legal definition of affirmative is something that requires effort; it 
is a duty to take a positive step to do something.252
251 See Sanford (note 86), Freedman (note 84), Plamondon (note 79), Dyk (note 73), and McLean 
(note 70).
The Supreme Court has designated 
affirmative rights in the past, such as the right to vote. While the Constitution does not 
specifically state that a black person can vote, neither does it state that a white person 
252 Black’s Law Dictionary (St. Paul: Thomson Reuters, 2009), 68 and 580.
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can. Voting under the Constitution is an affirmative right with the Fifteenth Amendment 
serving as the immediate source of that right.253 Similarly, it can be assumed that a 
minority student has an affirmative right to an equal education in a public school.254 In 
context of a candidate for office, a District of Columbia federal appellate court found that 
a candidate had an affirmative right of access to air time at a television station in order to 
communicate with voters.255 Even in the groundbreaking case of Gideon v. Wainright the 
Supreme Court noted that a defendant’s right in a felony case to legal counsel is an 
affirmative right, meaning the court should anticipate that such a defendant would need 
an attorney to help in legal defense.256 This is not to say that an affirmative right is 
absolute, or inflexible. It should not be confused with a negative right, where no other 
options are available.257
Foerstel noted that the Supreme Court had yet to establish a right of access as an 
affirmative right, but argued for its necessity and legal soundness.258
253 Ex Parte Yarbrough, Petitioner, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
His argument was 
254 Sheff  v. O’Neill, 238 Conn. 1 [678 A.2d 1267] (1996), 28.
255 CBS v. FCC, 629 F. 2d 1 (1980), 10.
256 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
257 Yniguez, et al. v. Arizonans for Official English, et al. v. State of Arizona, et al. v. State of 
Arizona, et al. 69 F. 3d 920 (1995). In a legal challenge to Arizona legislation, which required 
all government communication to be conducted in English, the court distinguished an 
affirmative right with a negative right, clarifying that plaintiff was not seeking to provide all 
information in multiple languages, but rather that government workers should not be 
precluded from communicating in languages other than English, in violation of the First 
Amendment.
258 See note 26.
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grounded in the claims of Emerson and Meiklejohn, who argued that an informed 
populace is crucial for its participation in its government, and that a right to gather and 
access information is a constitutional right.259 The Supreme Court has already established 
explicit constitutional protection of a citizen’s right to receive information.260 It has also 
at least recognized the importance of news gathering in accessing the government.261
Likewise, as with speech, this does not mean it is an absolute right. Like speech, 
there are exceptions found in the law. What an affirmative right does for court access is it 
provides clear language that court hearings are open to the public and that judges and 
officers of the court should act toward that assumption. It also sends a clear message to 
court administrators that court rules and policies should conform to this affirmative right. 
This also prevents establishing bad behavior, in which members of the press find 
themselves the lone soldier in a daily fight to keep open the thousands of hearings that 
take place in this country each day. Some courts have already upheld as constitutional 
In 
these cases, the Supreme Court applied the language of the First Amendment against the 
government’s abridgment of freedom of speech or of the press as an affirming right. 
Similarly, the right of access should likewise be afforded this protection. If the Supreme 
Court has adopted the positions of Emerson and Meiklejohn, that access is intimately tied 
to speech, then legal logic serves that it deserves that same level of protection.
259 See note 3.
260 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
261 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 480 U.S. 665 (1972); Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. 
Washington Post, 417 U.S. 834 (1974); and Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
75
similar affirmative language in state statutes. Arkansas and Missouri statutes both offer 
good examples, stating: “The sitting(s) of every court shall be public, and every person 
may freely attend the same.”262
Prong Two
The second prong of this test is that any movant seeking closure must meet a 
specific burden of proof. Specifically, a judge must find that a substantial probability of 
pretrial publicity would result in prejudicial harm. This is outlined in Justice Brennan’s
concurring opinion in Nebraska Press v. Stuart, in which the high standard of proof was 
necessary to protect what he saw as a the drastic remedy of closure.263 This standard 
surfaced again in both the first and second Press-Enterprise rulings, in which the justices 
rejected the California Supreme Court’s lesser standard of “reasonable likelihood” for 
“substantial probability.”264 A defendant, or even the prosecution, must show adequate 
reasoning and factual showing, under the substantial probability standard, that publicity 
would have a direct negative effect, and that closure would safeguard the chance for a fair 
trial.265
262 See Arkansas Supreme Court Writ of Mandamus, Case No. 78-34 (1979) and Missouri v. 
Lohmar, 5 Med. L. Rptr. 2156 [Case No. CV179-4169CC] (1979). Both state supreme courts 
have struck down challenge to this language.
The probability of this prejudice must go beyond being likely, but that the 
probability of this happening must be substantial. In addition to the Supreme Court’s
263 Nebraska Press, 572.
264 Press-Enterprise (1986), 14.
265 U.S. v. Dean, 5 Med. L. Rptr. 2595 [U.S. District Court Southern District of Georgia] (1980). 
New York v. Jones, 5 Med. L. Rptr. 1262 [New York Court of Appeals] (1979).
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adoption of this standard, other appellate-level courts have confirmed this level of burden 
on the defendant as appropriate.266 Requiring detailed legal reasoning also protects the 
integrity of the court and eliminates the chance that the closure could be brought up on 
appeal.267 While it may appear obvious that this burden is intended to respond to the 
public’s constitutional access right, this prong also protects a defendant’s Sixth-
Amendment right to public proceedings. The fact that the defense, or prosecution for that 
matter, makes a motion for closure, does not mean the court should accept it on its face. A 
careful reading and consideration of the argument must take place in order to protect a 
defendant’s Sixth-Amendment rights just as much as the public’s First-Amendment right. 
The Supreme Court has already noted in Richmond that defense and prosecution 
agreement on closure is not sufficient reason to grant it.268 There are more than two 
parties to a case, the public must be considered, which brings us to the third prong of this 
test.
Prong Three
Any attending member of the public should have a right to immediately object to a 
motion for closure and have a right to be heard. This was part of Justice Powell’s test 
266 Gannett Pacific v. Richardson, 3 Med. L. Rptr. 2575 [Hawaii SupCt., case No. 6946] (1978). 
Motion, 5 Med. L. Rptr. 1628 [Connecticut SupCt., case No. 42509] (1979). U.S. v. Powers, 6 
Med. L. Rptr. 2232 [8 USCA] (1980).
267 Oliver v. Postel, 1 Med. L. Rptr. 2399 [331 N.Y.S. 2d 407] (1972). In this case, a judge’s trial 
closure order was found unconstitutional because the judge made no showing in his ruling that 
the defendant could obtain a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment if the trial were closed.
268 Richmond, 557.
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framework in DePasquale,269 but it was also adopted by Justice Brennan in his 
concurring opinion in Nebraska Press, when he stated the press “has a right to be notified 
and accorded the right to be heard.”270 Several state supreme courts, such as Arkansas, 
Georgia, and Michigan, have established the public’s right to be heard.271 The 3rd Circuit 
U.S. Court of Appeals went as far as requiring judges to post advance notice of a motion 
of closure on the court docket for the public to see before ruling.272 While the spirit of the 
3rd Circuit judges in giving the public a chance to object to closure is admirable, the 
preservation of a defendant’s Sixth-Amendment right to a speedy trial must also be 
preserved. The requirement of an immediate objection by a member of the public is 
important in preserving this right, while affording the public its standing to be a party to a 
closure motion. It should also be pointed out that defendants can run the risk of waiving 
their speedy trial right if they do not immediately object to a prosecution’s, or judge’s, 
move to close a hearing.273
269 DePasquale, 401.
The right to be heard, however, does not necessarily imply 
that a member of the public must be prepared to begin citing legal case law off the cuff. 
Such an expectation would be unrealistic at best. The right to immediately object 
270 Nebraska Press, 608.
271 Phoenix Newspapers Inc. v. Hon. Renz D. Jennings, 1 Med. L. Rptr. 2404 [490 P. 2d 563] 
(1971). Commercial Printing v. Lee, 2 Med. L. Rptr. 2352 [Arkansas SupCt., case No. 77-65] 
(1977). WXIA-TV v. Devier, 5 Med. L. Rptr. 2454 [Connecticut SupCt.] (1980). Detroit Free 
Press v. Macomb Circuit Judge, 4 Med. L. Rptr. 2180 [Michigan SupCt., case No. 60470] 
(1979).
272 U.S. v. Criden, 8 Med. L. Rptr. 1297 [80 F. 2d 2309 (3rd Cir. 1982)] (1982).
273 Martineau v. Helgemoeg, 3 Med. L. Rptr. 1597 [New Hampshire SupCrt., case No. 7484] 
(1977).
78
preserves the public’s legal interest, while preserving the defendant’s speedy trial interest. 
Some attorneys may argue that holding a closure hearing itself delays a defendant’s right 
to a speedy trial. My response has two points. First, if the right of access is made an 
affirmative right, counsel should already be on notice to expect an objection to be raised 
to closure. Second, the trial judge under this test is already expected to consider the 
motion and submit findings of fact and conclusions of law on said motion. The time to 
consider a public or press argument is minimal at best.274 In addition to considering a 
motion, a judge should also be expected to consider alternatives to closing a courtroom, 
which leads us to the fourth prong of the test.
Prong Four
The fourth prong states that a judge must demonstrate that alternative means to
closure have been considered. This prong stems from the alternatives stipulated in 
Sheppard,275 and repeated by the Supreme Court in Branzburg276 and the Press-
Enterprise277
274 See, e.g., Carrie Switzer, “Judge Denies Motion to Close DUI Hearing,” Deseret News,
December 9, 2004. A consortium of Utah press outlets filed objection to a county prosecutor’s 
motion to close the preliminary hearing of a man accused of killing three people while driving 
drunk. The judge allowed the media attorney to appear by telephone for expediency.
decisions. This may include, but are not limited to, sequestering a jury from 
media access, issuing an order to officers of the court to avoid making outside public 
comments about the case, and instructing jurors to disregard outside information about 
275 Sheppard, 360-363.
276 See Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Branzburg, 709-710.
277 See Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in Press-Enterprise (1984), 513.
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the case and only consider the evidence presented during trial. Courts have also been 
known to instruct counsel to submit sensitive material in the form of written briefs and 
review that material privately in chambers.278 Courts have made it very clear that a judge 
must create adequate findings of fact in considering alternative solutions before ordering 
a pretrial, trial, or post-trial hearing closed.279 The courts have supported an affirmative 
duty upon judges to consider alternatives to closure, and that their reasoning must be 
shared with counsel and the public. This prevents court hearings from being needlessly 
closed and encourages courts to participate in balancing constitutional interests.
Prong Five
The fifth prong raises the issue of narrowness. It sates that a judge’s order of 
closure must be narrowly tailored as to avoid unnecessary impingement upon the public’s
right of access. Over the years the Supreme Court and lower courts have settled and re-
affirmed the importance of a judicial ruling being precise enough to deal with the 
constitutional concern, but adequately narrow in order to avoid unnecessarily impinging 
upon other constitutional rights. In Globe Newspaper Co., and both Press-Enterprise
decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed that any decision for closure must show “a 
278 U.S. v. The Progressive, 5 Med. L. Rptr. 1625 [467 F.Supp. 990] (1979). The 7th U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals denied the government’s motion to close oral arguments in seeking to 
prevent a magazine from publishing details about the atom bomb. Instead, the court sought 
alternative means by reviewing the sensitive information in chambers (in camera) before the 
hearing.
279 U.S. v. ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing, 6 Med. L. Rptr. 2232 [635 F. 2d 676] (1980). U.S. v. 
Edwards, 7 Med. L. Rptr. 1324 [430 A. 2d 1321] (1981).
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compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”280
While some restrictions of information can be warranted under reasoned legal findings of 
potential prejudice, the court must consider measures limited in scope just short of 
closing a hearing.281 Also, a hearing closure need not be absolute. A judge must consider 
whether closure should be limited to only those portions of a hearing that might be 
prejudicial, while leaving the rest of the hearing open to the public.282 By keeping a 
closure ruling sufficiently narrow, a judge is showing respect and acknowledgment of the 
public’s right to be present under the Constitution and case precedent.
Prong Six
While narrowness in scope is important, narrowness in the time span in which a 
closure order is expected to endure is also essential. The sixth, and last, prong deals with 
how long a closure order should be in effect. In Nebraska Press, Justice Blackmun wrote 
that each passing day of an order of prior restraint by a judge is “an irreparable 
infringement on First-Amendment values.”283
280 See note 52, Globe Newspaper Co., p. 606-607. Press-Enterprise (1984), 510.
While the court dealt with prior restraint in 
Nebraska Press, Blackmun’s passage demonstrates that the time span of a ruling 
281 Globe Newspaper Co., p. 607. Herald Association v. Ellison, 6 Med. L. Rptr. 1638 [Vermont 
SupCt., case No. 34-80] (1980). Doe v. Risher, 2 Med. L. Rptr. 1300 [District of Columbia 
SupCrt., case No. 10997-76] (1976).
282 Capital Newspapers v. Brown, 6 Med. L. Rptr. 1494 [New York SupCt., case No. 37118] 
(1980). New York v. Crimmins, 7 Med. L. Rptr. 1256 [New York SupCt., case No. 3975] 
(1981).
283 Nebraska Press, 580.
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restricting access was an issue that concerned him. In the majority opinion in Press-
Enterprise (1984), the justices noted that a subsequent denial to access transcripts of a 
voir dire hearing after a closure order, to protect privacy interests of prospective jurors 
and possible embarrassment, was not sufficient cause to have “prolonged” closure to keep 
the voir dire transcripts sealed.284 While a closed hearing may take place under clear legal 
reasoning and constitutional consideration, the Supreme Court has maintained that such 
an order limiting access must eventually expire once the threat of prejudicial harm has 
passed. Lower courts have also supported this time limit by finding that any limit on 
court access must be temporary and that hearing transcripts must be made available to the 
public within a reasonable amount of time, when the danger of prejudice has 
dissipated.285 In any order for closure, the time span in which the order is to take place 
must be considered. Once the threat of prejudicial harm has passed, the court must release 
transcripts of the hearing to the public. This prong prevents closure orders from becoming 
open ended, where an order prevents information about a case or trial from ever 
becoming available for no just cause.
Summary
By unifying elements from well-established Supreme Court and, state and federal 
appellate case law, this Court Access Test would eliminate some of the problems we have 
284 Press-Enterprise (1984), 510.
285 U.S. v. Edwards, 14 Med. L. Rptr. 1399 [5 USCA] (1986). Miami Herald v. Lewis, 8 Med. L. 
Rptr. 228 [Florida SupCt., case No. 59-392] (1982). Detroit Free Press v. Recorder’s Court 
Judge, 6 Med. L. Rptr. 1586 [Michigan SupCrt.] (1980).
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seen in recent closure cases. Requiring a more strict standard in which attorneys and 
judges must report their legal rationale behind their motions and orders for closure 
eliminates the temptation for last-minute, bench rulings in which the public cannot 
participate. By making the right of public access an affirmative right, judges are reminded 
of our justice system’s long history of openness, and the integral part public participation 
plays in maintaining its legitimacy.
Over the years, justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have made it clear that the 
press and public have a place as spectators within our courts. It is no longer just tradition, 
but a part of how our system of justice works. In more modern times, justices have paid 
special attention to the role journalists play as representatives to the public. Most citizens 
do not have the time to attend court proceedings, but that does not mean there is not a 
need to inform the public of what goes on in the courts, as a public space. In this study, 
we have seen the inclinations of some judges revealed when they have perceived a green 
light by the Supreme Court to go ahead and slam courtroom doors shut, such as after 
DePasquale was handed down. It is convenient and less troublesome not having outside 
parties scrutinizing the process, but it is this scrutiny that preserves the integrity of 
justice, just as in any aspect of democratic governance.
The Supreme Court has established the public’s place in the courtroom. A unified 
legal test will ensure that right of access. Justice flows from public participation. Public 
observation legitimizes a defendant’s right to a fair and public trial, and guarantees that 
burdens of proof are met, that legal tests are adhered to, and that rules of procedure are 
followed. Without public participation, our system of justice becomes a mysterious black 
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box of which citizens will grow ever more wary.
Judges can ill afford to view the press and public as strangers in their courtroom.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
In the latter part of the twentieth century the U.S. Supreme Court began to 
embrace what some of our country’s greatest legal scholars had come to realize: a free 
and open government needs a constitutional right to free speech, but its citizens should 
also have a constitutional right to know what their government is doing. Uninformed 
speech, it was realized, has no value and does little to ensure that citizens have the ability 
to participate in their own governance.
This evolution in legal thinking came into play in the courts when, for the first 
time in U.S. history, the Supreme Court found a constitutional right of the public and the 
press to access criminal trial hearings in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia. But before 
this groundbreaking case, courts were struggling to determine just how open courtrooms 
should be to the public. Past criminal trials, such as Sheppard and Murphy, had resulted 
in mistrial, and intense press coverage was to blame. A year before Richmond the High 
Court ruled in Gannett v. DePasquale that the public had no right of access to pretrial 
hearings under the Sixth Amendment right to a fair and public trial. Justices noted that 
right was reserved for the defendant. However, some justices, such as Lewis Powell, 
indicated that a right to access hearings could come under the First Amendment. Powell, 
in his dissent in DePasquale, created a framework for a legal test for access under the 
First Amendment, but that test was mostly forgotten because of Powell’s recusal in 
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Richmond. Almost immediately after DePasquale judges across the country began 
removing the press from hearings, including trials. We have seen evidence that it was not 
long until the justices realized clarification was needed, and soon. In the year between the 
two cases hundreds of motions were made for court closures. From a historical 
perspective, this thesis provides a compelling example of what happens when a ruling by 
the Supreme Court derails in application, and how justices then work to find a graceful 
way to remedy the problem. It also reveals the sometimes contentious relationship the 
courts have had with the press, the criticism by judges that members of the press were 
irresponsible and sensationalistic, and the criticism by the press that the courts were 
nailing shut courtroom doors. By analyzing the trajectory of U.S. Supreme Court cases 
dealing with court access, we can see the evolution in the justices’ thinking about the 
public’s role in the justice system and the reasons why justices ruled in favor of public 
access to the courts.
Justices recognized a long, historically proven tradition of open court proceedings 
in the United States. The public, as witness to proceedings, acts as a form of quality 
assurance, making sure attorneys and judges are acting in the interest of justice and 
avoiding the temptation to stray from the constitutional path. They also recognized that, 
in modern times, people’s busy lives precluded them from attending court hearings and 
that the press acts as surrogate for the public by relaying news of court business to 
citizens. This thesis serves to inform many key players in several important ways.
Legal research in mass communication aims to accomplish several goals. It can 
clarify the law through analysis of procedure, precedent and doctrine. It can suggest 
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changes in the law, or provide a better understanding of how law operates in society and 
how society shapes law. It can also serve to educate.286
First, judges should find this study a rich source of information regarding the legal 
genesis of constitutional court access, as well as hopefully a guidepost to a better, more 
clear standard to assessing when court closure is appropriate, given well-established 
Supreme Court precedent. The notion, as is popular among many judges and attorneys, 
that the interests of the Sixth Amendment and the First Amendment are directly opposed 
to one another, is dangerously oversimplified. It is wrong to think that holding open court 
is done at the expense of a defendant. Both Sixth and First amendments hold the common 
interest in open courts under the defendant’s right to public trial and the public’s right to 
attend that trial. Of course there are limited instances when a defendant’s right to an 
impartial jury could come into conflict with an open hearing. Those instances must be 
given careful consideration under a clear legal test by the court.
In this manner, I draw five 
conclusions from this study.
287
Second, for journalists who find themselves covering a story in a courtroom, this 
A defendant’s Sixth-
Amendment rights must be preserved, because they obviously have the most to 
personally lose, such as lifetime imprisonment, or worse. Judges should remain aware 
that the public nature of court proceedings enhances a defendant’s rights by guarding 
against legal malfeasance, and in a foundational perspective, an open justice system 
hinges on the presence of the public, whether in person, or by proxy of the press.
286 See note 37.
287 See Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), for criteria in which the 
Supreme Court found intense pretrial publicity can justify hearing closure.
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work should educate as to what rights have been established by the courts, and give them 
a clear understanding that their presence in courtrooms is more than just as a guest. 
Rather, they are an important and integral part of maintaining the integrity of the justice 
system. Journalists should also realize that their right to observe is balanced against other 
constitutional rights and is not absolute. Recognizing their important role in justice, 
journalists should treat their place with according reverence. My hope is to present this
research to journalists in conferences and in publications to ensure that more journalists 
are aware of their legal standing in courtrooms.
Third, communication scholars should find this study contributes to the greater 
historic and legal narrative of access law, which deserves further exploration. This work 
exemplifies a specific aspect of the broader right of access to government information. It 
can be applied to a variety of more specific topics regarding the right of access. The   
value in exploring a right of access to government information supports the broader goal 
of many communication scholars in seeking an open flow of information, an open 
exchange of ideas, and open opportunities to study the form and function of government.
Fourth, it would be valuable to expand the scope of this thesis in the future by 
exploring the formative history of access theory within the legislative and executive 
branches of government. A study of the formation of the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) by Congress, combined with this work, as well as a study of the growth in the use 
of Presidential Privilege to keep more information from the public, could give a richer 
understanding of how legal access theory developed in the twentieth century, and
continues to develop in the twenty-first century.
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Fifth, general citizens should find this work a source of civic inspiration. This 
piece should buoy confidence that the courts belong to the public and, as such, they are 
public spaces where citizens can gather and witness justice as a living entity. This 
information could prove useful to groups who support open courts and government 
transparency, as well as citizen journalists and bloggers.
While Richmond was a landmark case in finding a constitutional right to access 
the courts, and even though subsequent rulings expanded upon the decision, Richmond’s
fractured six-part concurring decisions, with no clear majority opinion, caused some 
confusion. The uncertainty in the language of rulings, and the lack of a clear legal test for 
access, has allowed judges to end-run the Supreme Court’s findings of a constitutional 
right of access. The elements of a test have rested for years in pieces strewn throughout 
many High Court decisions. This thesis does not repose at laying out the problems with 
court access, but aims to find a clear and legally sound solution to the problem. By 
unifying the elements lost in Powell’s dissenting opinion in DePasquale with the more 
current test in Press-Enterprise, a stronger standard can be established through a six-part 
unified test for court access. This test not only draws upon strong case law but also rests 
on the strong foundation of the legal philosophy of access: that access to information is 
the coin-side complement to freedom of speech, both are rooted in the First Amendment.
Without an informed public, speech becomes worthless. It is important that judges 
receive clear legal guidance on court access. Such guidance, the very purpose of legal 
tests, ensures sound legal decisions regarding court closures by declaring the proper
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weighing of constitutional interests. It is also important for courts to realize that public 
observation plays an integral role in preserving the integrity of our system of justice.
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